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INTRODUCTION 
The adoption of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act1 (the 
“FTDA”) in 1995, which incorporated a federal dilution clause into 
the Lanham Act,2 was preceded by a great deal of debate.  The 
question lying at the heart of the discussion was whether the dilu-
tion doctrine is consistent with sound trademark policy or whether 
the far-reaching entitlements that the FTDA affords the owners of 
famous marks have instead created “dilution” of a kind that Con-
gress may not have envisaged: a blurring of the conceptual 
boundaries of trademark law.3 
It turns out that this question has important implications on a 
number of trademark doctrines (such as inherent distinctiveness, 
functionality, and trade dress).  This Article’s thesis is that the di-
lution doctrine and the traditional tests for trademark infringement 
have the same rational basis – that they may all be coherently ex-
plained on the basis of the functional approach.  To prove this the-
sis, I will introduce two concepts: the “communication function” 
and “intrinsic reputation.”  On the basis of these concepts, I will 
argue that trademarks could not fulfill their economic functions if 
they were not protected against dilution.  Hence, I will conclude 
that the FTDA should be welcomed and that it should be applied to 
any name or device that is capable of fulfilling the functions for 
which we consider trademarks beneficial, be it a word, a symbol, 
 
1. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, §§ 3(a) & 4, 109 
Stat. 985-86 (effective Jan. 16, 1996) (codified as amended at, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 
1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998)). 
2. See Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998)). 
3. See, e.g., Jonathan Moskin, Dilution Law: At a Crossroads? Dilution or Delu-
sion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 125 (1993) 
(describing the dilution doctrine as a murky theory that courts cannot coherently apply); 
Kenneth Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution 
Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433 (1994) (noting that “[t]here is also no 
satisfactory theoretical justification supporting a federal dilution cause of action”); Robert 
N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark 
Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997); Paul Heald, Sunbeams Products, Inc. v. The 
West Bend Co., Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to 
Product Configurations, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 415 (1998). 
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or a product configuration. 
Part I explores the economic functions that trademarks per-
form, how they relate to each other and whose interests they serve, 
arguing first, that trademarks fulfill both a product-identifying 
function and a communication function, and finally, that some 
trademarks have an intrinsic reputation.  These two concepts sug-
gest a utilitarian justification of the dilution doctrine.  Part I also 
examines the various ways in which the likelihood of confusion 
test and the dilution doctrine (as well as the so-called identity rule 
in European trademark regimes) act together to ensure that trade-
marks can fulfill their economic functions.  Part I concludes that 
the dilution doctrine is as vital to preserving the economic and so-
cial benefits that are expected to ensue from trademarks as the tra-
ditional tests.  Part II examines why the dilution doctrine has 
sparked so much criticism in academia.  My explanation is essen-
tially twofold.  First, one’s attitude towards the dilution doctrine 
depends on one’s understanding of the functional canon of trade-
marks.  So long as the debate surrounds the issue of trademark 
functionality, the dilution doctrine will remain controversial.  Sec-
ond, the lack of popularity of the dilution doctrine in the academic 
world may have to do with the exclusive rights-free competition 
dichotomy that characterizes intellectual property law in general.  
Although this dichotomy is sometimes thought to apply to trade-
marks with particular force, I will argue that it should not. 
The questions discussed in this Article are not Lanham Act-
specific; they are basic questions every modern trademark regime 
confronts.  As a result, it is interesting to see how other jurisdic-
tions address them.  A comparative analysis will also complement 
the historical context in which the dilution doctrine has evolved in 
the United States.  The idea of protecting trademarks in the ab-
sence of a likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers began 
with an article that Frank Schechter wrote for the Harvard Law 
Review in 1927.4  Schechter’s views were markedly influenced by 
 
4. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 813 (1926). 
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the German trademark law of that period.5  As we will see, German 
trademark law has undergone a number of major changes since 
1927, one of the most significant ones involves the impact of 
European Community (“EC”) law on national law.  It may, for this 
reason alone, be interesting to see how the dilution doctrine, that 
has remained a debated topic in the United States for almost a cen-
tury, is construed and applied both in Germany and Europe today. 
I. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE DILUTION DOCTRINE 
A. What Trademarks Do 
The policy rationales underlying trademark law are manifold 
and disparate.  As one court put it, trademark law is “a peculiarly 
complex area of the law.”6  The modern approach to trademark law 
is to begin one’s analysis with the economic functions that trade-
marks perform, and once these functions have been identified, to 
decide which of them the law should protect in what way.7  The 
term “functional approach” dates back to an article by Felix Cohen 
written in the heyday of legal realism and in which he attacked, as 
many realists did, “the classical theological jurisprudence of con-
cepts.”8  But Cohen was not opposed to legal concepts as such.  
Conceptualization is, and remains, an important piece of legal 
methodology, especially in an area like trademark law, which is in-
terlarded with a number of concepts (such as “confusion,” “dilu-
 
5. See id. at 831 (referring to section 826 of the German Civil Code, which, at the 
time he wrote his article, was the statutory basis on which German courts afforded trade-
mark owners protection against dilution of their trademarks).  Under the influence of EC 
Council Directive No. 89/104, O.J. L 40/1 (1989), however, it is anticipated that that pro-
vision will lose much of its practical import. 
6. HMH Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1974). 
7. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §§ 3:1-2 
(2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].  For Germany, see KARL-HEINZ FEZER, 
MARKENRECHT [hereinafter FEZER], Einl MarkenG [Introduction], paras. 30–41, which 
emphasizes that the economic functions that trademarks perform are immediately rele-
vant for interpreting trademark statutes. 
8. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 821 (1935).  The rough equivalent to the functional approach in German law 
is the “Funktionenlehre.” 
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tion” and “distinctiveness”) and where these concepts serve the 
important task of organizing the law.  Cohen’s point was rather 
that concepts should not be treated as ends in themselves.  Instead 
of indulging in circular reasoning, one should examine the eco-
nomic facts upon which one bases one’s theories.  As a result, be-
fore criticizing the dilution doctrine, one must analyze and under-
stand the economic functions that trademarks perform. 
To take a functional approach to the analysis of the dilution 
doctrine means to examine the economic functions that trademarks 
perform and to shape and interpret the law in accordance with 
these functions.  The three jurisdictions examined in this paper all 
implicitly utilize a functional approach.  The most obvious indica-
tion of this is that the Lanham Act,9 the relevant EC legislation – 
Council Directive 89/104 (“Trademark Directive”)10 and Council 
Regulation 90/94 (“Trademark Regulation”)11 – and the German 
Trademark Act (“GTA”)12 all define their respective scopes by ref-
erence to what is the most fundamental function served by trade-
marks: their ability to identify and to distinguish products.13 
1. The Identifying Function 
One important function served by trademarks is the product-
identifying function, which is quite different from the source-
identifying function that often appears in the courts’ discussion of 
trademarks.14  The product-identifying function (or identifying 
 
9. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
10. See Council Directive 89/104, O.J. L 40/1-7 (1989) (approximating the laws of 
the Member States relating to trademarks) [hereinafter Trademark Directive]. 
11. See Council Regulation No. 40/94, O.J. L 11/1 (1994) [hereinafter Trademark 
Regulation]. 
12. See Markengesetz (MarkenG), V.25.10.1994, (BGBl.I S.3082), corrected in 
(BGBl 1995 I S.156) [hereinafter GTA] (trans. in Law on the Reform of Trade Mark Law 
and on the Incorporation of the First Council Directive of December 21, 1998, to Ap-
proximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 89/104/EEC, Law on 
the Protection of Trade Marks and Other Signs (Trade Mark Law) of October 25, 1994, 
WIPO, 1995).  (The GTA replaced the Warenzeichengesetz in its V.02.01.1998 version, 
BGBl.I S.29, BGBl.III 4, No. 423-1). 
13. See discussion infra Part I.A.1. 
14. See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) 
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function) can explain the likelihood of confusion test (as well as, 
arguably, the identity rule that EC trademark law and the GTA 
provide), but it cannot justify the dilution doctrine.  The latter can 
only be explained on the basis of the communication function.15 
The identifying function lies at the heart of the functional ap-
proach.  Its central position is also reflected in the way in which 
the law defines the concept of “trademark.”  Section 45 of the 
Lanham Act defines trademarks as names, symbols and other de-
vices that are able “to identify . . . goods and distinguish them.”16  
Relevant EC trademark legislation and the GTA contain similar 
definitions.17 
Usually, the identifying function is described in terms of the 
benefits conferred on consumers.  Consumers like the fact that 
trademarks identify products because this helps them go back to 
those products with which they fared well in the past and to distin-
guish them from those that proved unsatisfactory.18  Law and eco-
nomics theorists describe this as the fact that trademarks reduce the 
search costs of consumers.19  Two points, however, should be 
 
(noting that “[a] primary purpose of trade dress or trademark protection is to protect that 
which identifies a product’s source”); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 
277(7th Cir. 1998) (defining “secondary meaning” as source identification rather than 
product identification); see also Case C-10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG, 
1990 E.C.R. I-3711, 3758, para. 14 [hereinafter HAG II].  But cf. discussion infra Part 
II.A.2 (arguing that the source-identifying function is but a sub-function of the communi-
cation function). 
15. See discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
16. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998).  This is also the 
common law definition of trademark.  See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 3:1. 
17. See Trademark Directive No. 89/104, art. 2, O.J. L 40/1, at 2 (1989); Trademark 
Regulation No. 40/94, art. 4, O.J. L 11/1, at 3 (1994) (both requiring that trademarks be 
“capable of distinguishing . . . goods or services.”); see also GTA, supra note 12, § 3, at 
607 (containing similar language). 
18. See Schechter, supra note 4, at 818 (noting that “[t]he true functions of the 
trademark are . . . to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further 
purchases by the consuming public”); see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2:3.  See also 
HAG II, 1990 E.C.R. at I-3758, para. 13. 
19. See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270 (1988); Roger Van den Bergh & Michael Lehman, Informa-
tionsökonomie und Verbraucherschutz im Wettbewerbs- und Warenzeichenrecht [Infor-
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borne in mind.  On the one hand, the identifying function does not 
abolish search costs altogether, since in order to identify products 
that turned out to be satisfactory on previous occasions, consumers 
first have to find those products, and in order to do that, they have 
to make repeat purchases.  On the other hand, consumers may 
sometimes be able to obtain all the information they need to make 
an informed purchasing decision simply by inspecting the products 
before purchasing them.  Where pre-purchase inspections are pos-
sible, there is no need to rely on trademarks.  If inspection were 
always possible at zero cost, trademarks would become obsolete.20 
Not only does the identifying function reduce consumer search 
costs, it also mitigates the moral hazard problem that would other-
wise exist.  That problem may be described as follows: at any 
given price, rational consumers seek to buy the products of the 
highest quality available at that price, whereas manufacturers, in an 
effort to contain cost, try to sell the lowest quality they can.  If 
consumers had no means by which to tell good products from bad 
ones, they would risk picking the failures.  Economists call this the 
adverse selection problem. 
To get rid of this problem, consumers could require manufac-
turers to make pledges.  But the cost of enforcing pledges is high.  
And so instead of insisting on pledges, consumers would most 
likely ask for lower prices to offset the risk of making an adverse 
selection.  This, however, would create a dilemma.  By refusing to 
pay prices higher than “X,” consumers would put a ceiling on the 
budget of manufacturers.  This, in turn, would make it impossible 
for manufacturers to come up with fully satisfactory products.  But 
the incentive to cheat on consumers would remain.  Therefore, it 
would not matter how low the market price is; manufacturers 
 
mation Economics and Consumer Protection in Unfair Competition and Trademark Law], 
GRUR INT. 1992, 588, 589-590. 
20. See Roger Meiners & Robert Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: 
Property or Monopoly?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 911, 931 (1990); see also Phillip 
Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) (distinguish-
ing between search goods and experience goods and discussing the relative importance 
that information has for purchasers of products that fall within either of these categories). 
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would always have an incentive to offer consumers products of an 
even lower quality.  Hence, the result would be a vicious circle, by 
which high-end products would gradually be replaced by products 
of medium and poor quality until the market would finally be inter-
larded with “lemons.”21  By making products identifiable, trade-
marks destroy some of the incentive that manufacturers would oth-
erwise have to cheat consumers.  The assumption is that once 
manufacturers realize that underselling each other in terms of value 
for money does not pay off in the long run, they will engage in 
competition to the benefit of consumers.22 
In order to achieve the benefits just described, one central con-
dition has to be satisfied.  The law has to ensure that manufacturers 
do not use their trademarks in ways that would make it impossible 
or difficult for consumers to tell which mark stands for which 
product. 
2. The Communication Function 
In addition to the product-identifying function, trademarks also 
fulfill a communication function, which is key to explaining the di-
lution doctrine on a utilitarian basis.  As we will see, certain ele-
ments of the likelihood of confusion test, as it is currently applied, 
cannot be explained on the basis of the identifying function alone.  
This shows that courts have long since recognized that trademarks 
do not only identify products but also communicate with consum-
ers.23 
At the outset, it should be noted that the product-identifying 
 
21. The process of substitution was first described by George Akerlof, The Market 
for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 
(1970); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2:4 (citing to the Craswell Report 7 (1979) 
(FTC Policy Planning Issues Paper: Trademarks, Consumer Information and Barriers to 
Competition, FRC Office of Policy Planning)). 
22. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985) (not-
ing that “trademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of product qual-
ity”); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 271; HAG II, 1990 E.C.R. at I-3758, 
para. 13. 
23. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 3:2 A-B. 
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function and the communication function are intrinsically tied to-
gether.  It is not possible to protect one without simultaneously 
protecting the other.  As soon as a trademark identifies a certain 
category of products, it communicates with consumers by enabling 
them to associate all the product-related information available with 
the products that carry the mark.24  The following discussion illus-
trates how the product-identifying function and the communication 
function act together to tackle the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection that were introduced in the previous section. 
If a market is to yield Pareto optimal25 results, the participants 
in the market must have access to information relating to the rele-
vant products.26  Generally, the more such information is available 
and the more efficiently trademarks convey that information to 
consumers, the better.  Two types of information may be distin-
guished: (i) information relating to a product’s price; and 
(ii) information pertaining to its characteristics or quality. 
The price of a product is usually not difficult to obtain.  The 
real challenge for consumers is to find out about the product’s 
quality.  When consumers buy clothes, for example, they may ob-
tain as much product-related information as they want simply by 
inspecting the articles before effecting the purchase. In these cases, 
 
24. Because trademarks convey information, they create expectations in the minds 
of consumers.  But these expectations are of a purely factual nature.  When consumers 
purchase the same product over and over again or when a product is advertised in a uni-
form way, consumers will eventually come to understand the mark as a synonym for the 
product’s characteristics, much like Pavlov’s dog learns to identify the sound of the bell 
with the serving of dog food.  This happens irrespective of whether manufacturers are 
under a legal obligation to satisfy consumer expectations.  Therefore, it should be borne 
in mind that the term “guarantee function” that is often used does not refer to a legal 
guarantee.  See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 
F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987) (2d Cir. 1987); see also HAG II, 
1990 E.C.R. at I-3758, para. 13; FEZER, supra note 7, Einl MarkenG [Introduction], 
para. 32. 
25. See The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (1998) (Pareto 
optimality is “. . . a point from which no move can be made that would increase the wel-
fare of some individuals and make no one worse off”). 
26. See generally George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 
213 (1961). 
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consumers need rely neither on the identifying function nor on the 
communication function.  In most cases, however, pre-purchase in-
spections are impossible, either as a matter of fact or simply be-
cause they are too expensive.27  Moreover, although inspection 
may be possible, it is not always sufficient.  Computers, for in-
stance, may have latent faults that are not readily discernible upon 
inspection. 
One possible strategy to deal with these cases would be to se-
lect satisfactory products by trial and error, that is, to purchase a 
series of products and to avoid those that proved previously unsat-
isfactory.  We all use trial and error when we make purchasing de-
cisions.  It usually works because the product-identifying function 
helps us go back to the products that passed muster on previous 
occasions. 
And yet, if the identifying function were all that we could rely 
on, we would be poorly equipped.  The function requires that we 
already know which products are satisfactory and which are not.  
While the identifying function thus eliminates the adverse selection 
problem for the future, it does not alter the often costly need to find 
out which products are satisfactory.  By the same token, it is quite 
conceivable that some manufacturers care little whether their cus-
tomers return to them and may hence deliberately choose to sell 
lemons.  This suggests that while the identifying function mitigates 
the problem, it falls short of resolving it entirely. 
Again, risk discounts would be one possible way out.  The 
problem, however, is that they would trigger a substitution of low-
quality products for products of high quality.  Moreover, it is 
doubtful whether risk discounts would be in the interest of con-
sumers.  Presumably, many consumers would find it difficult, if 
not impossible, to value the risk associated with the purchase of a 
particular product and to calculate an appropriate discount.  Instead 
 
27. Imagine, for example, that there are a number of clothes manufacturers and that 
they reside in disparate locations.  In these circumstances, consumers might find it too 
expensive to inspect enough clothes to make a sensible decision as to which manufacturer 
offers the best deal.  See Nelson, supra note 20, at 311. 
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of making such calculations, most of them would prefer to have a 
yardstick by which they can tell in advance whether a particular 
product is a lemon or not.  Finally, the cost of picking a failure 
may sometimes be so high that the impending damage cannot be 
offset by a discount, however large that discount may be.  When 
one employs the services of a surgeon for a life-saving operation, 
for example, one has no choice but to trust his or her abilities. 
This is the point where the communication function enters the 
picture.  The communication function vastly enhances the pool of 
information that is available to consumers.  It does not create new 
information, but it enables consumers to take whatever product-
related information exists (such as their own experience and the 
experience of others, word-of-mouth recommendations by friends, 
and most importantly, commercial advertising) and attribute it to 
the products carrying the mark.28  With the onset of large-scale ad-
vertising and promotional measures, the communication function 
has gained ever-greater importance.29 
This is also where the source theory ultimately belongs.  When 
consumers encounter a new product that carries the same mark as a 
different type of product that they already know, it is the commu-
nication function, not the identifying function, that gives them an 
idea of what that product is like.30  Courts call this the “source-
identifying function.”31  But to say that trademarks identify the 
 
28. See Ralph Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of 
Trade symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1187 (1948) (noting that a trademark is “a narrow 
bridge over which all the traffic powered by product advertising must pass”). 
29. See Klieger, supra note 3, at 854 (noting that “[t]he type and amount of infor-
mation conveyed by trademarks has only increased during the twentieth century”). 
30. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §3:2 C; see also John A. Tessensohn, May You 
Live in Interesting Times: European Trademark Law in the Wake of Sabel BV v. Puma 
AG, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 217, 226-27 (1999). 
31. The modern reading of the source theory is that a trademark need not identify a 
particular manufacturer as the source of the products it carries so long as it is clear that 
they emanate from the same uniform source, even if that source is unknown to consum-
ers.  While this constitutes a departure from the more restrictive reading of the early days, 
the basic idea has remained the same: according to the source theory, the main function 
of trademarks is to identify the source or origin of products and not the products them-
selves.  See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918).  
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source of products obscures reality.  What trademarks really do is 
communicate to consumers—because a certain product emanates 
from a certain source, there is a fair chance that it bears all the 
characteristics that consumers associate with that source.  This re-
formulation is not just splitting hairs.  Communicating information 
relating to a product is different from identifying that product.  
And once we agree that the reason why consumers care about a 
product’s source is because that kind of information is relevant to 
their purchasing decision, it is easy to see that they might be inter-
ested in any kind of information that assists them in making a deci-
sion.  In reality, therefore, the source-identifying function is but a 
sub-function of the communication function. 
By identifying products and communicating with consumers, 
trademarks mitigate the problems of moral hazard and adverse se-
lection.32  Any set of trademark entitlements that serves to protect 
these functions would hence be consistent with the functional ap-
proach. 
3. Advertising and Intrinsic Reputation 
Trademarks are capable of emancipating themselves from the 
products in connection with which they are used.  When that hap-
pens to a trademark, it acquires an intrinsic reputation.  Rather than 
serving as an agent for the product carrying it, the trademark 
evokes expectations that are, to some extent at least, independent 
of any particular set of products. 
The concept of intrinsic reputation is best illustrated by way of 
an example.  Consider the three car brands “Audi,” “Mercedes,” 
and “Ferrari.”  All three are well-known, and yet, not all of them 
have an intrinsic reputation.  “Audi” is an example of a trademark 
 
See also Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushika Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 1997 
E.C.R. 37; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 3:8 (describing the evolvement of the source 
theory in the course of time). 
32. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2:4 (citing to the Craswell Report 7 (1979) 
which noted that “[i]f consumers can learn about the quality levels associated with each 
brand, this gives each manufacturer an incentive to improve the quality of his product as 
much as consumers are willing to pay for it”). 
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that arguably has no intrinsic reputation at all.  This is not to say 
that it does not convey information to consumers or that the expec-
tations that it excites in their minds are unfavorable.  The point is 
rather that the expectations it evokes relate to cars – and in particu-
lar, to cars that carry the label “Audi.” 
At the risk of stating the obvious, compare “Audi” to “Mer-
cedes” and “Ferrari.”  Unlike “Audi,” the term “Mercedes” serves 
not only as a shortcut to “Mercedes” cars.  Many consumers under-
stand the term as a synonym for quality as such.  Because the mark 
“Mercedes” is thus separable from the products in connection with 
which it is usually used, its reputation is intrinsic.  Similar consid-
erations apply with regard to the mark “Ferrari” since it, too, 
evokes expectations that are not exclusively linked to cars.  In-
stead, it signifies such values as sportiness and youth.  While the 
marks “Mercedes” and “Ferrari” are hence similar in that both 
have an intrinsic reputation, they are different in other respects, 
and these differences are important.  “Mercedes,” as we saw, 
stands for high quality.  Therefore, when it is affixed to products 
other than cars, it still conveys product-related information.  “Fer-
rari,” by contrast, arouses emotions that are completely unrelated 
to the physical aspects of any good or service.  In case of marks 
like “Ferrari,” the emancipation of the mark from the product is 
thus even more complete than for marks like “Mercedes.”33  Marks 
 
33. Lifestyle trademarks differ from ordinary trademarks in a number of respects.  
First, they often show network externalities, that is to say, the more well-known a life-
style trademark is (not necessarily the more people practice that lifestyle), the more at-
tractive it is to consumers.  As a result, successful lifestyle trademarks tend to be famous.  
The opposite need not be true.  There are, in fact, numerous trademarks that are famous 
but do not portray a particular lifestyle (for example, Kodak).  Secondly, companies can-
not create lifestyle trademarks in the same way as they can create ordinary marks: enter-
ing a sign into the federal register or using it in commerce does not as such make it a fa-
mous mark.  Because lifestyle trademarks are famous, their creation typically requires 
companies to spend huge amounts of money on advertising.  While the economic value 
of ordinary trademarks is largely a function of the success of the products that are offered 
under these marks, the value of lifestyle trademarks is therefore much more directly 
linked to the promotional efforts undertaken by their owners.  As a result, courts often 
use the amount of advertising that a trademark holder has spent on a mark as evidence of 
whether the mark is famous.  See, e.g., WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. 
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like “Ferrari” may be labeled lifestyle trademarks to underscore 
that when consumers buy a “Ferrari” car or a “Ferrari” T-shirt or 
any other product bearing the “Ferrari” logo, they do it primarily 
because of the image of the mark, and not so much because the 
cars are fast or red or hard to drive, or because the T-shirts are 
washable at high temperatures.34 
Trademarks with an intrinsic reputation such as the “Mercedes” 
star are generally a boon to consumers for reasons that are similar 
to those discussed in the context of the communication function: 
they enhance the amount of information that is available to con-
sumers.  For lifestyle trademarks, value is only very loosely, if at 
all, related to the physical aspects of the products that carry them.  
The question arises, then, whether lifestyle trademarks are useless, 
dangerous even, since they provide consumers with information 
that is too far removed from the product. 
On the one hand, because lifestyle trademarks create artificial 
needs, they induce socially undesirable behavior.  Moreover, com-
panies might use them to differentiate their products and to insulate 
themselves from the pressures of competition.35  On that theory, 
the law should discourage manufacturers from creating lifestyle 
trademarks.  On the other hand, whether a need is “real” or “artifi-
cial” can only be decided with regard to a predefined benchmark.  
Absent an overriding public interest, the best benchmark is the 
marketplace and the collective decisions made by the market par-
 
Pa. 1996), aff’d without op., 116 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toy-
ota Motor Sales, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev’d without op., 875 F.2d 
308, supp’l op., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989). 
34. This is not to say that consumers do not care about the physical characteristics 
and the quality of “Ferrari” cars, but the relative importance of these factors is minor as 
compared to the lifestyle image.  See Heijo Ruijsenaars, Die Verwertung des Werbewerts 
bekannter Marken durch den Markeninhaber [The Exploitation by the Trademark Owner 
of the Advertising Value of Famous Marks], GRUR INT. 1988, 385, 386. 
35. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that “[t]o 
the extent that [non-product related] advertising . . . succeeds, . . . economically irrational 
elements are introduced into consumer choices; and the trademark owner is insulated 
from the normal pressures of price and quality competition.  In consequence the competi-
tive system fails to perform its function of allocating available resources efficiently.”); 
see also Klieger, supra note 3, at 858. 
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ticipants.  There is no apparent reason why our attitude towards 
lifestyle trademarks should differ from that toward other products.  
Though this view is not universally shared,36 it finds support in 
economic literature, which has shown that there is no clear border-
line between informational advertising and persuasive advertis-
ing.37  On the one hand, every advertising measure is persuasive 
since the very purpose of advertising is to persuade consumers to 
purchase a particular good or service.  On the other hand, no matter 
how persuasive an ad or a commercial may be, it will always con-
tain some information since consumers would otherwise not decide 
to purchase the advertised product.  It is true that in the case of 
lifestyle trademarks, the information that an ad conveys is unre-
lated to the physical aspects of a product but instead concerns a 
certain lifestyle.  But this does not disturb our analysis.  So long as 
the information conveyed by the mark is accurate in the sense that 
it does not misstate verifiable facts, the law should not interfere. 
One might even think favorably about lifestyle trademarks, be-
cause arguably, they facilitate competition in mature markets.  In 
such markets, of which the tobacco industry provides many exam-
ples, there are often no significant potentials for product innova-
tion.38  As a result, the creation and promotion of lifestyle trade-
marks is one of the last areas in which companies still have the 
opportunity to compete.  This is not to say that companies will 
 
36. See Klieger, supra note 3, at 856 (noting that “[m]ost advertising . . . is not in-
formational, but persuasive, and persuasive (or transformational) advertising, directed at 
creating a brand personality and aimed at the consumer’s heart rather than his mind, plays 
a more dubious role”). 
37. See Philip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974).  Cf. 
Federal Trade Comm’n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (noting that “[u]ndeniably advertising may sometimes be used to create irra-
tional brand preferences and mislead consumers as to the actual differences between 
products, but it is very difficult to discover at what point advertising ceases to be an as-
pect of healthy competition. . . . It is the consumer who must make that election through 
the exercise of his purchasing power.”). 
38. See Moskin, supra note 3, at 136 (noting with reference to a Wall Street Journal 
survey that brand loyalty in the tobacco industry is higher than in any other consumer 
product industry.  This makes quality and price competition even more difficult than it is 
already given the lack of sufficient potentials for product innovation.). 
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necessarily grasp this opportunity, but its mere existence may 
make the formation and policing of cartels more difficult than it 
would be otherwise.39  Of course, competition via lifestyle trade-
marks does not necessarily lead to better products, and again, the 
example of the tobacco industry is instructive.  Leaving aside non-
market factors (such as the threat of class actions seeking punitive 
damages), tobacco companies have no interest in inducing smokers 
to switch to cigarettes with lower nicotine content even though we 
might regard such cigarettes as “undesirable” from society’s point 
of view.  On the contrary, they might be induced to create lifestyle 
marks that are aimed at making smokers switch to more addictive 
products.  And yet, these criticisms turn against cigarettes, not 
against lifestyle trademarks.  Leaving nicotine aside, one might 
welcome the competitive opportunities that lifestyle trademarks 
create. 
The bottom-line is that trademarks that have an intrinsic repu-
tation create certain benefits.  This is self-evident for marks like 
“Mercedes,” which confer the benefits upon consumers that were 
discussed in the previous section.  It is less clear for marks like 
“Ferrari,” which are lifestyle trademarks that do not convey prod-
uct-related information.  The main benefit of the latter is that they 
might be seen as impeding coordination in mature industries.  Ob-
viously, this does not mean that lifestyle trademarks deserve more 
protection than other kinds of trademarks.  It suggests, however, 
that one should at least avoid condemning them merely because the 
kind of information they convey to the public is not product-
related. 
 
39. See PHILIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, at 259 (5th ed. 
1997) (noting that non-price competition, including “effective advertising,” may make 
coordination impossible since “[t]o hold price above competitive levels creates a power-
ful incentive for each oligopolist to win increased business by any means that does not 
threaten the price structure. . . . [B]ecause there is always the possibility that a rival might 
make such a move, each oligopolist may feel compelled to continue planning for new 
advertising campaigns or style changes in order to be able to respond quickly when nec-
essary.”).  Id. 
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B. Trademark functions and the applicable law 
The traditional test for infringement in the trademark laws of 
the United States, the EC and Germany is the likelihood of confu-
sion test. This test essentially asks whether the allegedly infringing 
trademark is so similar to an existing mark that, given the similar-
ity of the products in connection with which the two marks are 
used, there is a likelihood that consumers might get confused.40  
EC trademark law and the GTA, however, provide a special rule 
for those cases in which a junior user adopts a mark that is identi-
cal with a senior mark and uses it in connection with exactly the 
same set of products.41  While the Lanham Act subjects this fact 
pattern to the likelihood of confusion inquiry,42 the European ap-
proach in these cases affords the trademark owner absolute protec-
tion.43  As we will see, this identity rule is interesting in light of the 
functional approach.  Finally, there is the dilution doctrine, which 
exists in all three jurisdictions.  The dilution doctrine applies only 
to famous marks and even when there is not the slightest likelihood 
of confusion.44 
In each of the currently fifteen Member States of the EC, Euro-
pean and national trademark law coexists. In case of a conflict be-
tween the two, the former automatically takes precedence over the 
latter.45  The centerpiece of EC trademark law is the Trademark 
 
40. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 
1961) (listing the factors for the likelihood of confusion test as: the strength of his mark, 
the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of products, the likelihood 
that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, the reciprocal defendant’s good 
faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication 
of the buyers). 
41. See Trademark Directive No. 89/104, art. 4(1)(a), O.J. L 40/1, at 3 (1989) (The 
identity rule of Article 4 of the Trademark Directive states: “A trade mark shall not be 
registered or, if registered, shall be liable to be declared invalid: (a) if it is identical with 
an earlier trade mark, and the goods or services for which the trade mark is applied for or 
is registered are identical with goods or services for which an earlier trade mark is pro-
tected . . .”). 
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994). 
43. See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
44. 15 U.S.C. 1127(c) (1994 & Supp. 1999). 
45. See Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, O.J. L 11/1 (1994). 
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Regulation, which was adopted in 1993 and entered into force in 
1994.46  Under the Trademark Regulation, companies may obtain 
protection throughout the EC by registering their marks with the 
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market.47  Companies 
thereby avoid the lengthy and expensive process of obtaining indi-
vidual registrations in each of the Member States.48  Given this ad-
vantage, the general expectation is that the Trademark Regulation 
will eventually become the principal source of trademark protec-
tion in Europe.49  Meanwhile, however, national trademark laws of 
the Member States continue to apply.50 Early on in the history of 
the EC, it became clear that the patchwork of existing national 
trademark regimes conflicted with the European vision of a single 
market.  The EC’s response to this problem was twofold.  First, the 
European Court of Justice ruled that it is illegal for companies to 
use their national trademark rights to block parallel imports, as this 
would allow price discrimination between Member States.51  
Moreover, in 1988, the EC adopted the Trademark Directive.52  
The Directive, which entered into force in 1989, had the aim of 
harmonizing the national trademark laws of the Member States.53  
 
46. See id. 
47. This follows from the principle of supremacy of Community law that the Euro-
pean Court developed in Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585.  Because that 
principle has no temporal limits, article 106 of the Trademark Regulation provides that 
the Regulation does not affect existing trademark rights under the laws of the Member 
States.  See Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, art. 106, O.J. L 11/1, at 27 (1994). 
48. See Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, O.J. L 11/1 (1994). 
49. See, e.g., Thomas C. Vinje, Recent Developments in European Intellectual 
Property Law: How Will They Affect You and When?, 13 J.L. & COM. 301 (1994); Baila 
H. Celedonia, The Impact of European Integration on Intellectual Properties Symposium 
Commentary, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 751 (1992). 
50. See Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, O.J. L 11/1 (1994). 
51. See, e.g., Case 16/74 Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183, 1195 
(noting that trademarks might be used “to partition off national markets and thereby re-
strict trade between Member States, in a situation where no such restriction was neces-
sary to guarantee the essence of the exclusive right flowing from the trade mark”); Case 
3/78 Centrafarm BV v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 1979 E.C.R. 1823; Case 102/77 Hoff-
mann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 1978 E.C.R. 1139. 
52. See Trademark Directive No. 89/104, O.J. L 40/1 (1989). 
53. Directives are the legal instruments that the EC usually uses to harmonize the 
laws of the Member States.  See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 
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Germany implemented the Directive in 1994 by enacting the 
GTA.54  Because the GTA is based on the Trademark Directive, its 
provisions are similar to those contained in the Directive.55  There-
fore, to avoid repetition, this Article focuses on the GTA and refers 
to the Trademark Regulation and Trademark Directive only in 
those cases where they deviate significantly from the GTA. 
1. Same Mark, Same Product: The Identity Case 
The Trademark Directive, Trademark Regulation, and GTA 
contain special provisions for the identity case. They afford trade-
mark owners an absolute right to prohibit third parties from using 
signs that are identical on products that are exactly alike.56  The 
practical result is that a trademark owner who seeks redress for in-
fringement in the identity case need not show a likelihood of con-
fusion.57  In contrast, the Lanham Act treats situations where iden-
tical marks are used on identical products in the same way as when 
similar marks are used in connection with similar products.58 
 
1992, art. 189, [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992) [hereinafter TEU].  Art. 189(3) of the EC 
Treaty states that “[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
member state to which it is addressed; but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods.” See EC Treaty, art. 189(3), O.J. C 224/1, at 65 (1992). 
54. See GTA, supra note 12, at 601. 
55. The provisions of the Trademark Directive are also very similar to those con-
tained in the Trademark Regulation.  This is merely a result of the fact that the two were 
prepared and adopted by the same legislative bodies, albeit in different procedures.  See 
Trademark Directive No. 89/104, O.J. L 40/1 (1989); Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, 
O.J. L 11/1 (1994). 
56. See Trademark Directive No. 89/104, art. 5(1)(a), O.J. L 40/1, at 4 (1989); 
Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, art. 9(1)(a), O.J. L 11/1, at 5 (1994); GTA, supra note 
12, § 14(1)(1), at 612.  The fact that an identical mark is already used on an identical set 
of products is also a ground for registration refusal or invalidity.  See Trademark Direc-
tive No. 89/104, art. 4(1)(a), O.J. L 40/1, at 3 (1989); Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, 
art. 8(1)(a), O.J. L 11/1, at 4 (1994). 
57. See FEZER, supra note 7, § 14, para. 74; Rolf Sack, ‘Doppelidentität’ und ‘ge-
dankliches Inverbindungsbringen’ im neuen deutschen und europäischen Recht [‘Double 
Identity’ and ‘Mental Association’ under the New German and European Law], GRUR 
1996, 663, 664. 
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (for registered trademarks); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (for 
unregistered marks) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
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Article 16 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) takes an intermedi-
ate position.  While it subjects all infringement cases to the likeli-
hood of confusion test (similar to the Lanham Act), it presupposes 
a likelihood of confusion in the identity case (similar to the 
GTA).59 
In many cases, the various tests will yield the same results sim-
ply because the likelihood of confusion among consumers is par-
ticularly strong when two manufacturers use the same trademark 
on identical products.  And yet, there are cases in which the differ-
ence matters. 
One category concerns cases involving product piracy.  Con-
sider, for instance, software piracy.  Because digital copies of a 
program are indistinguishable from their original, rational consum-
ers will be indifferent as to which one of the two they purchase.  In 
fact, leaving the threat of criminal prosecution aside, they might 
prefer the copy since it is usually less expensive.  Under the likeli-
hood of confusion test, the best that the producer of the original 
could do to establish trademark infringement is argue that even 
though the actual purchasers of the copies may be aware of what 
they are doing, there is still a risk of post-sale confusion of poten-
tial consumers.60  To establish post-sale confusion, however, is not 
only a burdensome exercise, it is not even certain whether it would 
reach software piracy cases at all. Instances in which courts find 
 
59. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, art. 16(1), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  Article 16(1) of the 
TRIPS Agreement provides: 
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third 
parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade identical or simi-
lar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which 
the trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion.  In 
case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confu-
sion shall be presumed. 
  Id. 
60. See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre 
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955) (discussing 
the concept of “post-sale confusion”). 
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post-sale confusion typically involve products that are visible to 
the public during their ordinary usage.61  The use of software, 
however, normally does not occur in public.  As a result, the out-
come of a piracy case under the likelihood of confusion test is 
doubtful.62  Under a rule of absolute protection, however, all that 
the software producer would have to do is show that the copy and 
the original are identical and that they are distributed under the 
same mark.63 
Another category of cases in which the identity rule may lead 
to different results than the likelihood of confusion test is export 
trademarks.  The Austrian “Bayer” case of the mid-1980s is in-
structive.64  In Austria, Bayer enjoyed trademark protection for its 
mark “Baygon” in connection with insecticides.  A third party 
made insecticides using the mark “Baygon” without Bayer’s con-
sent.  But instead of selling its insecticides in Austria, it exported 
them to Saudi-Arabia.  The Austrian Supreme Court denied in-
fringement on the ground that there was no likelihood of confusion 
among domestic customers.65  At the time, Austrian trademark law 
did not provide an identity rule but only a likelihood of confusion 
test.  Under the identity rule, the fact that the “Baygon” trademark 
was used on the same products would have been sufficient to find 
infringement. 
 
61. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(“Wrangler’s use of its projecting label is likely to cause confusion among prospective 
purchasers who carry even an imperfect recollection of Strauss’s mark and who observe 
Wrangler’s projecting label after the point of sale.”); see also Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
62. Without a showing of likelihood of confusion, the special anti-counterfeiting 
provisions of the Lanham Act are inapplicable as well.  See Lanham Act § 34(d)(1)(B), 
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (“[T]he term ‘counterfeit mark’ 
means . . . any spurious mark . . . the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause 
mistake, or to deceive”); see also Trademark Counterfeiting Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2320(d)(1)(A)(iii) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (providing a comparable scope). 
63. This is not to say that trademark law should protect software as intellectual 
property.  But it should protect the ability of the trademark to identify the software and to 
communicate to consumers that it was made by a certain manufacturer. 
64. See Austrian Supreme Court, ÖBL 1987, 41. 
65. See id. 
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The question remains whether the identity rule is desirable 
from a policy perspective.  The answer is given by the functional 
approach.  When different manufacturers use the same trademark 
on products that look exactly alike, the mark is deprived of its abil-
ity to identify products in an unambiguous manner. This is espe-
cially true when the products are of a disparate quality, in which 
case the mark’s ability to communicate is impaired as well.  
Hence, the use of the same trademark on the same set of products 
completely destroys the mark’s ability to identify and to communi-
cate.  In a case such as this where the intrusion on the functionality 
of a trademark is so manifest and so complete, there appears to be 
no reason why its owner should be required to demonstrate confu-
sion among consumers or even a likelihood that such confusion 
might occur.  Instead, the functional approach suggests that in 
these cases, infringement should follow as a matter of law from the 
mere fact that a twin copy of an existing mark is used in connec-
tion with products that fall within the same category.66 
Since the functional approach applies on both sides of the At-
lantic, similar conclusions hold true with respect to the domestic 
situation.  The only difference is that instead of making a distinc-
tion between the identity case and the use of similar marks on simi-
lar products, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act subjects both cases 
to the likelihood of confusion test.67  Although courts may have 
wanted to develop a special rule for the identity case, they have not 
had the opportunity to do so.  As “few would be stupid enough to 
make exact copies of another’s mark or symbol,”68 such cases have 
not presented themselves.  Hence, the lack of precedent on this 
matter should not be regarded as conclusive.  If anything, the few 
decisions that are available indicate an awareness that the identity 
case does differ from cases involving the use of similar marks on 
similar products and that the likelihood of confusion test is not par-
ticularly helpful in these circumstances.69 
 
66. See FEZER, supra note 7, § 14, para. 72. 
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
68. Baker v. Master Printers Union, 34 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D.N.J. 1940). 
69. See, e.g., Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 F.2d 1190, 
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This is not to suggest that the Lanham Act should be amended.  
However, it is useful to bear in mind that the Lanham Act is a 
codification of the common law on trademarks, and as such, it is 
open to judicial refinements. As the Supreme Court noted in a de-
cision long before the adoption of the Lanham Act, exact likeness 
is not “necessary” to establish trademark infringement.70  The 
Court’s statement seems to suggest that exact likeness is something 
more than a likelihood of confusion.71  This statement should be 
read as implying that where the trademark owner succeeds in prov-
ing exact likeness, the issue of likelihood of confusion is irrelevant. 
2. Likelihood of Confusion 
If the junior mark is merely similar to the senior mark or the 
products on which the marks are used are not exactly alike, the 
remedies available in the various jurisdictions appear to be uni-
form.  The Lanham Act, the Trademark Regulation, the Trademark 
Directive, and the GTA all require that the trademark owner prove 
a likelihood of confusion among consumers.72  This prong of the 
infringement test is critical, since it serves as a bridge between the 
identity case, in which the same mark is used in connection with 
identical products, and the dilution doctrine, which applies even in 
 
1195 (2d Cir. 1971) (recognizing, where defendant and plaintiff both sold cameras under 
an identical trademark, that “purchaser inspection would be of doubtful value” and that 
there was a “high probability of confusion,” but declining to grant plaintiff absolute pro-
tection); see also National Bd. of YMCA v. Flint YMCA, 764 F.2d 199, 202 (6th Cir. 
1985) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that “cases involving use of the identical symbol 
are different from ordinary trademark cases which ‘are predicated on the complaint that 
the defendant employed a trademark so similar to that of the plaintiff that the public will 
mistake the defendant’s products for those of the plaintiff,” and arguing that, for purposes 
of a preliminary injunction, the likelihood of confusion should be presumed) (emphasis in 
original). 
70. See Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19, 33 (1900) (noting that 
“[i]t is not necessary to constitute an infringement that every word of a trade-mark should 
be appropriated.  It is sufficient that enough be taken to deceive the public in the purchase 
of a protected article.”). 
71. See id. 
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); Trademark Directive No. 89/104, art. 4(1)(b), 
O.J. L 40/1, at 3 (1989); Trademark Regulation No. 40/94 art. 8(1)(b), O.J. L 11/1, at 4 
(1994); GTA, supra note 12, § 14(2)(2), at 612. 
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those cases where the products involved are wholly dissimilar. 
At first glance, the Lanham Act appears to provide two differ-
ent likelihood of confusion tests.  With regard to unregistered 
marks, section 43(a) requires the plaintiff to show that the defen-
dant’s use of the mark “is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the af-
filiation, connection, or association of such person with another 
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person . . . .”73  
By contrast, section 32(1)(a), which deals with marks that have 
been entered into the federal register, merely speaks of confusion 
without further defining the scope of that concept.74 
In practice, however, courts apply the same tests under both 
provisions.75  Trademark owners must show that as a result of the 
allegedly infringing behavior, there is a likelihood that consumers 
might get confused: (i) as to the source of the products that are sold 
under the infringing sign; (ii) as to whether the owner of the mark 
has endorsed or sponsored the products that carry that sign; or 
(iii) as to whether the owner of the mark and its alleged infringer 
are affiliated or otherwise linked to each other.76 
Unlike the Lanham Act, the GTA does not differentiate be-
tween registered and unregistered marks.77  To establish infringe-
ment, section 14 of the GTA simply requires trademark owners to 
show “a likelihood of confusion, which includes the likelihood of 
association between the sign and the mark.”78  The GTA does not 
define the concept of confusion.  In particular, it does not indicate 
 
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
75. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:76. 
76. See Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816, 821 (S.D. Ohio 
1983) (noting that “the ‘likelihood of success’ requirement is met if it is established that 
the alleged infringement creates ‘a likelihood of confusion’ in consumers’ minds regard-
ing the source, endorsement, affiliation or sponsorship of a particular product”).  See also 
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:8; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:6. 
77. See GTA, § 14, supra note 12, at 612. 
78. GTA, § 14(2)(2), supra note 12, at 612.  The GTA translation follows the Eng-
lish version of article 5(1)(b) of the Trademark Directive.  See Trademark Directive No. 
89/104, art. 5(1)(b), O.J. L 40/1, at 4 (1989). 
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whether that concept covers confusion as to affiliation and as to 
whether the owner of the mark and the alleged infringer are eco-
nomically or otherwise linked to each other.  Much is therefore left 
to courts79 and scholars, both of which play an important role in in-
terpreting the GTA.  In response to a question posed by the Ger-
man Supreme Court, the European Court recently clarified that the 
concept of confusion has to be given broad scope.80  The German 
Supreme Court recently followed that decision.81  The interpreta-
tion that German courts give to the concept of confusion largely 
parallels domestic law.82  To establish infringement, a trademark 
owner has to show a danger that consumers might mistake the 
identity of the trademarked product or its source, or erroneously 
associate the owner with the allegedly infringing sign.83  The rele-
vant provisions of EC trademark law are again similar to those 
contained in the GTA.84 
If the law aims to ensure that trademarks can identify products 
and communicate product-related information to consumers, it 
would seem to be enough to afford them absolute protection in the 
identity case.  This is exactly what the GTA does and what domes-
 
79. The courts that are competent to interpret the GTA are the German courts.  Indi-
rectly, however, the European Court’s case law bears on the interpretation of the GTA as 
well.  As we saw earlier, the GTA is based on the Trademark Directive.  As a result, 
German courts are under an obligation to interpret the GTA in accordance with the 
Trademark Directive.  This way, the European Court’s interpretation of the Trademark 
Directive becomes relevant for the GTA. 
80. See Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushika Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 
1997 E.C.R. 39 (“[t]here may be a likelihood of confusion . . . where the public percep-
tion is that the goods or services have different places of production”). 
81. See GRUR 1999, 245; see also MARKENR 1999, 93; FEZER, supra note 7, § 14, 
paras. 341 & 345. 
82. See 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (for unregistered trademarks); see also Wendy’s Int’l 576 
F. Supp. at 816. 
83. See FEZER, supra note 7, § 14, paras. 128-143. 
84. Article 5(1)(b) of the Trademark Directive affords trademark owners protection 
whenever “there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public . . . which in-
cludes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark.” Trademark Di-
rective No. 89/104, art. 5(1)(b), O.J. L 40/1, at 4 (1989).  Article 9(1)(b) of the Trade-
mark Regulation contains a virtually identical provision.  See Trademark Regulation No. 
40/94, art. 9(1)(b), O.J. L 11/1, at 5 (1994). 
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tic courts should do.  In practice, however, identification and 
communication occur in the minds of consumers, and the way in 
which consumers perceive a trademark is influenced by a variety 
of factors, such as the extent to which there are other marks out 
there that look similar or that are used on similar products.85  When 
two marks are totally different or, while similar, are used in con-
nection with different kinds of products, we may assume that there 
is a fair chance that consumers will make the right association.  
But the more similarities the marks share and the more similar the 
products are, the harder it gets for consumers to retain a clear 
mind.  The more similarities exist, the greater the impediment to 
the marks’ ability to identify products and to communicate with 
consumers.86  From the perspective of the functional approach, this 
is the problem that the likelihood of confusion test seeks to resolve. 
Therefore, from the perspective of the functional approach and 
without regard to the black-letter law, confusion has to be under-
stood as a state of mind in which consumers either mistake two 
trademarks or erroneously attribute a feature of one mark to prod-
ucts sold under another in a manner that impairs either the mark’s 
identifying function or its ability to serve as a means of communi-
cation.87  Accordingly, one may distinguish two types of confu-
sion: one relating to the identifying function and the other to the 
communication function.  A trademark’s ability to identify prod-
ucts is impaired when it is so similar to the infringing sign that a 
reasonable consumer would fail to recognize that the two identify 
 
85. See Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495. 
86. Conceivably, there is a point at which the risk of confusion becomes so great 
that the economic benefits that we expect to ensue from the use of trademarks are re-
versed.  Assume, for example, that two manufacturers used trademarks that looked virtu-
ally identical and affixed them to similar products.  Assume further that the products, 
even though of similar appearance, were nevertheless of a very different quality.  If a 
regular purchaser of the high-quality product, unaware of the lemon, relied faithfully on 
the mark and nevertheless picked the lemon, its search costs would be greater than if it 
had inspected the products in the first place. 
87. This means that for dogmatic purposes, the concept of “confusion” has to be 
treated as a term of art that derives its scope and content from the functional approach.  
See FEZER, supra note 7, § 14, para. 104.  As a result, the issue of likelihood of confusion 
should be treated as a question of law with all the consequences that this entails. 
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different products.  This “confusion in the narrower sense” empha-
sizes that in these cases, consumers get confused in the ordinary 
sense of the word: they mistake one mark for another. 
The other kind of confusion, which one might call “confusion 
in the wider sense,” concerns cases in which the infringing sign 
impairs the mark’s ability to communicate.  This occurs when con-
sumers erroneously attribute the information that the mark conveys 
to the products sold under the infringing sign. 
Consider a trademark that designates a popular brand of energy 
drinks.  Imagine that somebody else uses a mark that looks confus-
ingly similar to advertise a sports event, a beach volleyball tour-
nament, for example.  In this case, the mark’s ability to identify 
energy drinks is not impaired.  So long as the soft drink producer 
does not organize sports events and the promoter of the tournament 
does not engage in the business of selling soft drinks, consumers 
can easily tell one from the other.  In this situation, there is no dan-
ger of confusion in the narrower sense.  The mark’s identifying 
function is not at stake.  Depending on the circumstances, how-
ever, the mark’s ability to communicate with consumers may well 
be affected.  For one thing, it is quite conceivable that the volley-
ball tournament benefits from the goodwill of the energy drink 
brand.  If that were the case, then part of the communicative stream 
that runs from the manufacturer of the energy drinks to its con-
sumers would be redirected to the promoter of the volleyball tour-
nament.  Hence, there would be an “association,” as the GTA calls 
it,88 or confusion in the wider sense.  The mark’s communication 
function would suffer.  Moreover, since communication is a bi-
directional process, the way in which the promoter of the sports 
event organizes the tournament might have repercussions on the 
feelings and expectations that consumers have towards the energy 
drink.  If, for example, the energy drink were known for high qual-
ity and a refreshing effect on athletes, and the teams participating 
in the tournament turned out to be mediocre, consumers would be 
faced with incongruous messages.  The presence of conflicting 
 
88. See GTA, § 14(2)(2), supra note 12, at 612. 
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messages might impede the trademark’s ability to convince con-
sumers to purchase the energy drink. 
Against the background of this discussion, it appears that the 
various instances of confusion that courts have recognized in their 
case law neatly fit into the two categories developed above: confu-
sion in the narrower sense and confusion in the wider sense. In 
those cases in which courts are worried that consumers might be 
unable to identify a product by its trademark, it is the product-
identifying function that is at stake.  In our terminology, there is a 
risk of confusion in the narrower sense.  Those cases, however, 
where courts have found a likelihood of confusion as to source, or, 
more recently, as to affiliation, endorsement and sponsorship, all 
involve some kind of confusion in the wider sense.  In these cases, 
the mark’s ability to communicate is what threatens to be impaired.  
The fact that courts found it necessary over time to expand the 
concept of “source” seems to show that they are becoming increas-
ingly aware of the fact that trademarks serve as means of commu-
nication, and that, as a matter of policy, the communication func-
tion ought to be protected. 
EC and German trademark law hint that the likelihood of con-
fusion test does more than merely prevent confusion in the nar-
rower sense.  Section 14 of the GTA,89 following Article 5(1)(b) of 
the Trademark Directive, states that the concept of “likelihood of 
confusion” goes beyond those cases in which there is a likelihood 
of confusion in the narrower sense by providing that the likelihood 
of confusion “includes the likelihood of association.”90  This con-
cept is similar to confusion in the wider sense.91 
 
89. See GTA, § 14 (2)(2), supra note 12, at 612. 
90. Id. 
91. This formulation gave rise to a great deal of confusion in Germany since it was 
recognized early on that the concept of “confusion,” when interpreted literally, is nar-
rower than the concept of “association.”  Accordingly, the question was raised of how the 
likelihood of confusion could ever include the likelihood of association.  The courts’ po-
sition in that debate was that association without confusion is impossible.  Scholars were 
divided.  See Sack, supra note 57, at 664.  On the basis of the legislative materials Sack 
argues for a wide understanding of the concept of “confusion.”  See also FEZER, supra 
note 7, § 14, paras. 83-84 (reaching the same conclusion by arguing that the concept of 
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Finally, the distinction between confusion in the narrower 
sense and confusion in the wider sense is also helpful in explaining 
why strong marks are often afforded a greater degree of protection 
than weak ones.92  At first glance, this unwritten rule looks like a 
paradox, since intuitively we might think that the risk of confusion 
should be lower, not higher, the more distinctive and famous a 
mark is.  In light of the functional approach, however, this is not a 
paradox at all.  On the one hand, more distinctive marks are gener-
ally less likely to be subject to confusion in the narrower sense.  A 
person leaving a bar at curfew is less likely to mistake his hat for a 
hat belonging to somebody else when that hat is highly distinctive.  
On the other hand, the risk of confusion in the wider sense is 
greater in the case of strong marks than in the case of weak marks, 
since this kind of confusion does not require that consumers err 
about the identity of the trademarked products.  It is enough if they 
attribute some of the information that is communicated by the 
mark to products sold under the infringing sign.  Obviously, the 
stronger a mark, the more information the public associates with it, 
and the greater therefore the risk that when somebody else uses the 
same mark, consumers will mistakenly attribute some of the in-
formation to the infringing sign.93 
In sum, the likelihood of confusion test and the way in which it 
is interpreted by the courts is consistent with the functional ap-
proach.  Moreover, the scope that courts give to the concept of 
“confusion” shows that they recognize that trademarks not only 
identify products but that they also communicate with consumers. 
 
“confusion” is a term of art the scope of which is not necessarily identical with the usual 
meaning of the term “confusion”). 
92. See, e.g., Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350 cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 862 (1992); see also FEZER, supra note 7, § 14, paras. 271-274. 
93. See Moskin, supra note 3, at 135 (quoting some empirical research in support of 
the proposition that the more products a mark is used on, the more difficult it is for con-
sumers to make the correct association, but emphasizing that more such proof will be re-
quired before the dilution doctrine may be applied “with greater confidence”). 
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3. Dilution 
The dilution doctrine, the principal focus of this Article, is 
clearly the most far-reaching prong of the infringement test and at 
the same time, the most recent addition to it.94  The first part of the 
ensuing discussion will explore the history of the dilution doctrine.  
The second part will compare the differences in the dilution doc-
trines of the United States, the EC and Germany. 
a.  History of the Dilution Doctrine 
The term “dilution” goes back to an article that Frank Schech-
ter wrote for the Harvard Law Review in 1927.95  Schechter in turn 
borrowed the term from German courts, which, at the time he 
wrote his article, afforded trademark owners protection against 
“Verwässerung” (“dilution”) of their marks.96  When Schechter 
wrote his article, the German dilution doctrine was already well in 
place, and it is interesting to see both how it had developed up to 
then and how it developed in subsequent years.97  Initially, the Su-
preme Court of the German Empire granted anti-dilution protection 
 
94. The FTDA, which codified the dilution doctrine at the federal level, was enacted 
in 1996.  See Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. 1998).  
The EC was a few steps ahead.  In 1994, it adopted the Trademark Regulation, which 
provides anti-dilution protection for Community trademarks.  See Trademark Regulation 
No. 40/94, O.J. L 11/1 (1994).  The Trademark Directive of 1989, in article 5(2) contains 
a model anti-dilution provision as well.  Unlike most of the directive’s provisions, how-
ever, article 5(2) is optional: the Member States of the EC may (but need not) adopt it in 
their national laws.  Germany implemented the Trademark Directive in 1994 by adopting 
the GTA.  See Trademark Directive No. 89/104, art. 5(2), O.J. L 40/1, at 4 (1989). 
95. See Schechter, supra note 4, at 832; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 
24:66. 
96. See Schechter, supra note 4, at 832 (quoting a decision by a German federal 
court, which held that “complainant has ‘the utmost interest in seeing that its mark is not 
diluted [verwässert]: it would lose in selling power if everyone used it as the designation 
of his goods’”). 
97. See Michael Lehman, Die wettbewerbswidrige Ausnutzung und Beeinträchti-
gung des guten Rufs bekannter Marken, Namen und Herkunftsangaben [The Unfair Ex-
ploitation and Tarnishment of Famous Marks, Names and Signs of Origin], GRUR INT. 
1986, 6, 8 (discussing in more detail the development of the German dilution doctrine); 
see also FEZER, supra note 7, § 14, paras. 410-412; Baumbach & Hefermehl, 
WARENZEICHENGESETZ, § 31, paras. 190 et seq. 
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on the basis of section 1 of the German Unfair Competition Act 
(“UCA”).98  Section 1 of the UCA prohibits actions in the context 
of business dealings that are taken for competitive purposes and 
that violate public morals.99  It is generally accepted that this pro-
vision makes exploiting the reputation of a competitor’s trademark 
illegal.100  For the prohibition to apply, however, the trademark 
owner has to show that the infringer acts “for purposes of competi-
tion.”101  For a long time, courts interpreted that proviso as de-
manding that the products made by the trademark owner and those 
made by the infringer would be substitutable.102  As a result, the 
scope of section 1 of the UCA was de facto limited to cases where 
the infringer made products that were in direct competition with 
those manufactured by the trademark owner.  This meant that no 
relief was available in those circumstances in which the likelihood 
of confusion test did not operate, and in which section 1 of the 
UCA would thus have made most of a difference.  Later on, courts 
based similar decisions on section 823 in connection with sec-
tion 1004 of the German Civil Code (“GCC”).103  These provisions 
are general tort law and are interpreted as protecting a businessper-
son’s right to his business.  Unlike section 1 of the UCA, they do 
not require a competitive relationship.  Such was basically the state 
of German anti-dilution law as it stood when Schechter wrote his 
article.  In subsequent years, the German Supreme Court relaxed 
the substitutability test it had applied under section 1 of the 
UCA.104  It is now enough if the infringer asserts that his products 
are equal to those of the trademark owner and thereby seeks to ex-
ploit the reputation of the latter’s mark for its own advantage, irre-
 
98. See, e.g., RGZ 170, 137; see also German Unfair Competition Act, V.7.6.1909 
(RGBl.I S.499) BGBl. III 4 No. 43-1 [hereinafter UCA]. 
99. See UCA, supra note 98, at § 1, at 499. 
100. See RGZ 170, 137 (as an early example of an anti-dilution decision based on 
section 1 of the UCA); see also GRUR 1959, 25; BGHZ 86, 90; BGHZ 91, 465; BGHZ 
91, 609; BGHZ 93, 96; GRUR 1987, 711 (for more recent examples). 
101. UCA, supra note 98, §1, at 499. 
102. See, e.g., GRUR 1959, 25. 
103. See §§ 823 and 1004 Nr. 1 BGB. 
104. See BGHZ 86, 90; BGHZ 93, 96; GRUR 1987, 711. 
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spective of whether the two products are in competition with each 
other.105  This change in case law made it easier for trademark 
owners to bring dilution claims on the basis of section 1 of the 
UCA.  Following the enactment of the GTA in 1994, which con-
tains an express anti-dilution provision, however, the importance 
of section 1 of the UCA, as well as of section 823 in connection 
with section 1004 of the GCC are expected to decline.106 
In the United States, seventy years passed before Schechter’s 
proposal to protect trademarks against dilution materialized at the 
federal level in the FTDA, in a somewhat modified and restricted 
form.107  The FTDA modifies the 1946 original version of the Lan-
ham Act, which did not afford trademarks protection against 
dilution.  Prior to the FTDA, several attempts to incorporate a dilu-
tion clause into the Lanham Act were made, but had failed.108  As 
early as 1947, however, states began to adopt their own anti-
dilution statutes.109 
In its post-FTDA version, section 43(c)(1) of the Lanham Act 
provides that “[t]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled . . . to 
an injunction against another person’s commercial use in com-
 
105. See, e.g., BGHZ 86, 90, (95). 
106. See FEZER, supra note 7, § 14, para. 441; see also GRUR 1994, 495; GRUR 
1995, 57 (providing examples of cases in which courts based their decisions on sec-
tion 14 of the GTA). 
107. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
108. The last attempt to amend the Lanham Act, prior to the adoption of the FTDA 
in 1995, was made as part of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988.  See H.R. 5372, 
100th Cong. (1988).  See generally Jerome Gilson, Dilution Law: At a Crossroads? A 
Federal Dilution Statute? Is It Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 107, 114 (1993) (describing 
the path the dilution doctrine took into the FTDA and explaining that the reason why it 
did not make it into the Act was not because it was controversial but “for political, horse-
trading reasons”). 
109. The first state anti-dilution statute was adopted in Massachusetts.  See 1947 
Mass. Acts 300, repealed by 1973 Mass. Acts, ch. 897 § 2, replaced by 1975 Mass. Gen. 
Laws, ch. 110B § 12.  The FTDA does not preempt state anti-dilution statutes.  See H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995).  It provides, however, that federal registration of a trade-
mark “shall be a complete bar to an action . . . that is brought . . . under the common law 
or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, 
label, or form of advertisement.” Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).  See 4 
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 24:77-24:82 (reviewing the state anti-dilution statutes). 
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merce of a mark . . . if such use begins after the mark has become 
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the 
mark.”110  Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines the term “dilu-
tion” as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify 
and distinguish goods, regardless of the presence or absence of 
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other par-
ties, or likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”111  Among 
the factors that the law considers relevant to the inquiry into 
whether a mark is famous or not are “the degree of inherent or ac-
quired distinctiveness of the mark” and “the duration and extent of 
advertising and publicity of the mark.”112 
In contrast to section 45 of the Lanham Act,113 section 14(2)(3) 
of the GTA does not mention the term “dilution.”114  In substance, 
however, it is clear that the entitlements that it affords trademark 
owners are aimed at protecting them against dilution.115  The pro-
visions of the Trademark Directive116 and the Trademark Regula-
tion117 are virtually identical to those contained in the GTA. 
b.  Comparing US, EC and German Dilution Doctrines 
While all three jurisdictions contain provisions that are aimed 
at preventing dilution, they sound quite different.  Section 43(c) of 
the Lanham Act applies to “famous” marks.118  Article 5(2) of the 
 
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
112. See WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d without 
op., 116 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997); Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (examining how a famous mark is advertised). 
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
114. See GTA, supra note 12, § 14(2)(3), at 612. 
115. See id. (seeking “to prevent all third parties . . . from using in the course of 
trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trademark in relation to goods or 
services which are not similar to those for which the trademark is registered, where the 
latter has a domestic reputation and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair 
advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade-
mark”). 
116. See Trademark Directive No. 89/104, art. 5(2), O.J. L 40/1, at 4 (1989). 
117. See Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, art. 9, O.J. L 11/1, at 5 (1994). 
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
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Trademark Directive requires that a mark, in order to be eligible 
for protection, have a “domestic reputation.”119  This difference in 
language should not be overestimated, however, since section 
14(2)(3) of the GTA,120 which implements the Trademark Direc-
tive, speaks of famous marks.121  In substance, the dilution doctrine 
is therefore restricted to famous marks. 
But what makes a mark famous?  In answering this question, 
one should bear in mind that the concept of “fame” is a term of art.  
Accordingly, it derives its scope from the law.  Section 43(c) of the 
Lanham Act provides a list of factors that courts are required to 
take into account in deciding whether a mark is famous.122  Inter-
estingly, the provision speaks of factors that determine whether a 
mark is “distinctive and famous”, which suggests that the fame of a 
mark is linked to its distinctiveness.123  The exact nature of that 
link, however, is problematic.  In the view of a well-known com-
mentator, the Act’s dual mentioning of the words “distinctive” and 
“famous” reflects a drafting error, which should simply be ig-
nored.124  He argues that since the FTDA mentions the terms “dis-
 
119. Trademark Directive No. 89/104, art. 5(2), O.J. L 40/1, at 4 (1989). 
120. See GTA, supra note 12, § 14(2)(3), at 612. 
121. See id. 
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
 In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider fac-
tors such as, but not limited to: (A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctive of the 
mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or ser-
vices with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and public-
ity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; 
(E) the channels of trade for the goods and services for which the mark is used; (F) the 
degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the 
marks’ owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and 
extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was 
registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the 
principal register. 
Id. 
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (emphasis added); see also Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toy-
ota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1032 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring) (noting, 
long before the FTDA was enacted, that “an extremely strong mark” is one that is “truly 
of distinctive quality”). 
124. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:91 (McCarthy derives his conclusion 
from the fact that the term “distinctive” was first mentioned in the 1987 Trademark Re-
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tinctiveness” and “fame” in one breath, it regards them as syno-
nyms.125  Moreover, according to that commentator, the require-
ment of “distinctiveness” is redundant since, in order to be eligible 
for protection, trademarks have to be distinctive anyway (either in-
herently so or through acquisition of secondary meaning).126 
Closer examination reveals, however, that the concept of “dis-
tinctiveness,” far from being redundant, may actually lie at the 
heart of the dilution doctrine.  Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act not 
only mentions the term “distinctive” when it introduces the list of 
relevant factors, it also states that one such factor is “the degree of 
inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark.”127  Indeed, the 
degree of distinctiveness is the first factor that is listed, which sug-
gests that the drafters of the FTDA considered it especially rele-
vant to the question of whether a mark is famous or not.128  More-
over, implicit in section 43(c) of the Lanham Act is the assumption 
that the distinctiveness of a mark is variable.129  The fact, therefore, 
that every trademark has to be distinctive to a certain extent in or-
der to qualify for protection does not preclude that some marks are 
more distinctive than others and that the more distinctive ones may 
 
view Commission Report, which reflected the goal that dilution protection should be con-
fined to marks “which are both distinctive, as established by federal registration at a 
minimum, and famous, as established by separate evidence.”).  See also Report of the 
Trademark Review Commission, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 459 (1987).  According to 
McCarthy, however, when Congress amended the proposal and dropped the requirement 
of federal registration in 1995, it failed to drop the term “distinctive.”  See 4 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 7, § 24:91. 
125. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:91. 
126. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 24:91-92.  But see Clinique Lab. v. Dep 
Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (equating distinctiveness (in this case arbi-
trariness) and fame.  “Both the CLINIQUE and CLINIQUE & C marks are arbitrary des-
ignations that provide no description of the products to which each relate. Clinique’s 
marks are therefore strong.”). 
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
128. But see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:92 (arguing that, on the basis of ex-
isting state anti-dilution laws, the term “degree of ‘distinctiveness’ here is used only as a 
synonym for the degree of ‘fame’ needed for the mark to qualify for the special protec-
tions of section 43(c)”). 
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
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merit a higher degree of protection.130 
That the concept of “distinctiveness” is in fact key to under-
standing the dilution doctrine becomes clear when we take a closer 
look at the harm which the dilution doctrine seeks to prevent.  Sec-
tion 45 of the Lanham Act prohibits the “dilution of the distinctive 
quality of the mark,” and defines dilution as “the lessening of the 
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods.”131  
The distinctiveness of the famous mark is thus the object of protec-
tion.  Similarly, section 14(2)(3) of the GTA forbids any use of a 
sign that “takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the dis-
tinctive character or the repute of the trademark.”132  It appears, 
therefore, that the reduction of the distinctive quality of a famous 
trademark is a core case of dilution, both under the Lanham Act 
and for purposes of the GTA.  But we also see that while the 
Lanham Act restricts the scope of the doctrine to this case, the 
GTA goes further.  It prohibits not only the reduction of the dis-
tinctive character of a famous mark but also its exploitation.133  A 
utilitarian explanation of the dilution doctrine based on the func-
tional approach addresses why the law prohibits this reduction and 
exploitation. 
c.  Dilution from a Utilitarian Perspective 
As famous marks are usually much more distinctive than ordi-
nary marks (simply because the more well-known a mark is, the 
more it stands out of the anonymity of the market), the risk that 
their product-identifying function might be impaired is virtually 
non-existent.  Presumably, therefore, this function does not provide 
a promising starting point for explaining why famous marks should 
 
130. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 1998) (not-
ing that “[u]nder the FTDA, . . . a party who wishes to establish fame of the trade dress 
for which protection is sought bears a significantly greater burden than the burden of es-
tablishing distinctiveness for infringement purposes”). 
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). 
132. GTA, supra note 12, § 14(2)(3), at 612 (emphasis added). 
133. See GTA, supra note 12, § 15(3), at 613. 
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be afforded legal protection against dilution.134 
Different considerations, however, apply with respect to the 
communication function.  On the one hand, famous marks are ex-
posed to the usual risk of confusion in the wider sense (as to 
source, affiliation, endorsement or sponsorship).135  These risks are 
adequately handled by the likelihood of confusion test, and there is 
no need to protect them against dilution.  On the other hand, how-
ever, the communication function of famous marks holds itself 
open to a further point of attack – one that the concept of confusion 
does not capture.  Marks that are well-known, unique and distinc-
tive are in a far better position to catch the attention of consumers 
than ordinary signs.136  This ability to arouse attention is independ-
ent of the marks’ reputation.  To illustrate this point, consider a 
hypothetical case where a company decided to produce lipsticks 
and sell them under the name “Audi.”  Let us further assume, in 
accordance with the relevant tests, that there is no risk of confusion 
–- neither in the narrower nor in the wider sense—simply because 
it seems unlikely that a consumer of average sophistication seeing 
the “Audi” lipstick would assume that they are connected with the 
 
134. I will not attempt to explain the dilution doctrine on the basis of the product-
identifying function.  It should be noted, however, that such an explanation might well be 
possible in light of cases that suggest that in certain circumstances, the use of a famous 
mark by a third party may destroy its ability to identify.  Such is the case, for example, of 
Internet domain names, which used to be issued on a first-come, first-served basis.  See, 
e.g., Panavision Int’l, 945 F. Supp. at 1304 (noting that “[a]s a result of the current state 
of Internet technology, Toeppen was able not merely ‘to lessen[] the capacity of a famous 
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,’ 15 U.S.C. § 1127, but to eliminate the 
capacity of the Panavision marks to identify and distinguish Panavision’s goods and ser-
vices on the Internet”). 
135. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (recognizing that courts view this risk as 
greater for famous marks than for ordinary marks.  There is a sliding scale on which 
strong marks receive more protection than weak ones, and famous marks lie on the top 
end of that scale.). 
136. In my opinion, this is what Schechter had in mind when he said that “the more 
distinctive the mark, the more effective is its selling power.” See Schechter, supra note 4, 
at 819.  Schechter’s use of the word “selling power” has often been misunderstood as a 
synonym for “goodwill.”  Arguably, however, given the context in which he made that 
statement, it seems as if what Schechter really meant was not a mark’s goodwill but its 
ability to attract attention among consumers. 
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“Audi” car company.  The lipstick manufacturer could therefore 
not create and benefit from the belief that its products are some-
how affiliated with the car company (whatever benefits this might 
entail).  Moreover, the mark “Audi” has no intrinsic reputation,137 
and so the lipstick producer could not capitalize on that either.  
Nevertheless, its decision to use the mark “Audi” instead of creat-
ing one of its own might be advantageous.  The attention of the av-
erage consumer is more likely to be caught by a famous mark such 
as “Audi” than by a commonplace sign.  In taking advantage of 
this fact, the lipstick producer would exploit the distinctiveness of 
that mark.  At the same time, as a result of the fact that the same 
mark would now be used by two companies, the uniqueness of the 
mark would be reduced. 
The question is whether the law should protect the ability of 
famous marks to arouse attention.  I argue that it should, and not 
just because it is unfair to take what belongs to someone else, but 
also for utilitarian reasons.  When a mark is famous, this usually 
means that the products in connection with which it is used enjoy 
widespread popularity among consumers.138  Hence, one might, in 
order to induce manufacturers to make such popular products, give 
them the carrot of anti-dilution protection.  There is no danger of 
overprotection since the dilution doctrine does not kick in until af-
ter a mark has become famous.  No manufacturer can therefore 
claim the benefits of the dilution doctrine before its products and 
the mark under which it holds them out in commerce have 
achieved the requisite popularity.  This constitutes a significance 
difference to copyright law, which is based on a similar idea but 
which is far more generous.  Copyright law does not demand that a 
work of art have an artistic value in order to be protected.139  The 
 
137. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
138. See Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (“The 
dilution doctrine is only available to protective distinctive marks as exemplified by such 
famous names as ‘Tiffany,’ ‘Polaroid,’ ‘Rolls Royce,’ and ‘Kodak’”). 
139. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, 
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known 
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”) (emphasis added); Feist 
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extremely diminished originality standard in copyright law140 pre-
sents a much lower hurdle than the “fame” requirement of the dilu-
tion doctrine.141 
The incentive-based argument is particularly apt to justify the 
distinctiveness prong of the dilution doctrine, that is, those cases in 
which the infringer either reduces or exploits the distinctive char-
acter of a famous mark (as opposed to its reputation).  Courts and 
commentators traditionally refer to this kind of dilution as “dilu-
tion by blurring.”142  The FTDA itself does not use the term “blur-
ring.”143  The legislative materials that led to its adoption, how-
ever, leave no doubt that Congress intended the Act “to encompass 
all forms of dilution recognized by the courts, including dilution by 
blurring . . . .”144  German scholars refer to the phenomenon as 
“Verwässerung” (dilution) of a mark.145  The impairment of a 
mark’s distinctiveness is also what Schechter appears to have un-
derstood by “dilution.”146 
 
Pub., Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (stating that “the 
constitutional requirement necessitates independent creation plus a modicum of creativ-
ity”); see also Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (1997). 
140. See id. 
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (listing factors to determine a mark’s distinctiveness & 
fame); see also infra text accompanying note 127; McCarthy, supra note 7, § 24:91-92. 
142. The term “blurring” appears to have its roots in state anti-dilution statutes and 
the case law of state courts, which afforded trademark owners protection against dilution.  
The ways in which the concept of “dilution by blurring” is defined varies.  See, e.g., 
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (requiring that “defendant 
use[] or modif[y] the plaintiff’s trademark to identify the defendant’s goods and services, 
raising the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of 
the plaintiff’s product” (emphasis in original) (internal footnote omitted)). 
143. Section 45 of the Lanham Act merely speaks of the “dilution of the distinctive 
quality of the mark.”  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
144. H.R. 374, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995).  Cases in which courts have applied 
the concept of “blurring” after the FTDA was enacted include: Intermatic Inc. v. Toep-
pen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Panavision Int’l, 945 F. Supp. at 1296; Clinique 
Lab. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
145. See Fezer, supra note 7, § 14, para. 427. 
146. The author’s original definition sounds a little bit different.  See Schechter, su-
pra note 4, at 825 (defining dilution as “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the 
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-
competing goods”).  Section 45 of the Federal Trade Dissolution Act is more concise, 
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The other prong of the dilution doctrine, which seeks to protect 
a famous mark’s reputation, is dilution by tarnishment, or “Ru-
fausbeutung,” as German courts and scholars call it.147  Again, the 
FTDA itself does not use that term but the legislative materials 
make it clear that tarnishing behavior falls within the scope of the 
Act.148  Dilution by tarnishment is claimed (and often found) in 
cases where a sign that looks similar to a famous mark is used in a 
context that is unfavorable to that mark.149  One way of justifying 
the tarnishment doctrine is with the utilitarian approach, which ar-
gues that affording the owners of famous marks protection against 
tarnishment, which is an entitlement that is not available to the 
owners of ordinary marks, gives manufacturers an extra incentive 
to make their products popular and their trademarks famous.150 
For the many famous marks that have an “intrinsic reputation,” 
however, the tarnishment doctrine may be justified on yet another 
ground.  As we saw in our discussion of the functional approach, 
some famous marks have a reputation that is completely independ-
ent of the products in connection with which they are used.  We 
called this reputation “intrinsic” because it is inseparably linked to 
the respective mark, following that mark everywhere, regardless of 
the associated product.  Because the reputation of such marks is in-
 
defining the requisite behavior as the “dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.”  
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c) (1994 & Supp. 1998).  Nevertheless, the concept is blurred, and 
sometimes, courts go back to Schechter’s formulation.  See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, 945 F. 
Supp. at 1296. 
147. See FEZER, supra note 7, § 14, paras. 425-26; see also GRUR 1983, 247; BGH 
1985, 550 (for cases involving dilution by tarnishment). 
148. See H.R. 374, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995). 
149. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(dismissing plaintiff’s claim that the use of its “SPAM” trademark for luncheon meats to 
identify a Muppets show character might create the image of evil in porcine form).  
Those cases in which courts have found dilution often involve vastly inferior products or 
sexual and otherwise obscene material.  See, e.g., Hasbro Inc. v. Internet Entertainment 
Group, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding dilution of the mark “Candy-
land” by use of “candyland.com” as a domain name to identify a sexually explicit Inter-
net site). 
150. See generally, Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for 
“Famous” Trademarks: Anti-Competitive “Monopoly” or Earned “Property” Right?, 47 
FLA. L. REV. 653, 708-09 (1995). 
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trinsic and hence independent of the products and manufacturers to 
which they belong, third parties may exploit them even in cases 
where there is no likelihood of confusion in the narrower or in the 
wider sense. 
The policy question that this raises is whether the law should 
prevent such parasitic behavior.  If our ultimate aim is to reduce 
the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, then we have 
to forbid the unauthorized use of marks that have an intrinsic repu-
tation.  To see why, consider the example of a manufacturer of 
climbing ropes who uses the “Mercedes” star to advertise its prod-
ucts.  Even if consumers do not think that the ropes are affiliated 
with the car manufacturer – and given the remoteness of the prod-
ucts, there is no reason why they should – they might still be de-
ceived.  As the reputation of the mark “Mercedes” is intrinsic, con-
sumers understand it as a sign of quality, irrespective of the context 
in which it is used.  Hence, if the climbing ropes turned out to be 
of a vastly inferior quality, the effects on consumers would be dis-
astrous – and not just in terms of safety.  They would find them-
selves deceived by the mark, and the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection would blossom as if trademarks had never ex-
isted. 
In summary, there appear to be two separate reasons to think 
favorably about the dilution doctrine.  On the one hand, it affords 
manufacturers an extra incentive to provide consumers with satis-
factory products.  On the other hand, it complements the likelihood 
of confusion test for those marks that have an intrinsic reputation, 
thereby reducing the problems of adverse selection and moral haz-
ard.  As a result, it appears that the dilution doctrine is as consis-
tent with the functional approach as the identity rule and the likeli-
hood of confusion test.  More importantly, all three prongs have 
the same rational basis. 
II. DOMESTICATING THE DILUTION DOCTRINE 
When the FTDA was enacted, the concern was raised that the 
entitlements that it affords trademark owners might be inconsistent 
with what used to be regarded as the rational basis of trademark 
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protection: the prevention of confusion among consumers.151  One 
reason why the dilution doctrine is sometimes perceived as incon-
sistent with traditional trademark policy appears to be that there is 
no consensus as to which economic functions trademarks perform 
and how the law should protect them.  The other reason is an irra-
tional tendency to be more critical of trademarks than of other 
kinds of intellectual property, resulting in suspicion when the law 
affords trademark owners new sets of entitlements, especially 
when they are as extensive as those contained in the FTDA. 
A. Do Trademarks Prevent Deceptive Conduct? 
One court observed that the central issue is “not whether peo-
ple will confuse the marks but whether the marks will confuse 
people.”152  This view neatly summarizes what is sometimes called 
the “consumer protection model.”153 
1. The Consumer Protection Model 
The problem with this model is that it attributes to the concept 
of “likelihood of confusion” a meaning that it does not have, and in 
doing so, it misperceives, in a fundamental way, the rational basis 
of trademark protection.  It creates the impression that trademark 
law was primarily aimed at protecting consumers against deception 
by manufacturers.154 
 
151. See articles cited, supra note 3. 
152. In re West Point–Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201 (C.C.P.A. 1972).  See also 
Schechter, supra note 4, at 819 (noting that “[t]he protection of trademarks originated as 
a police measure to prevent ‘the grievous deceit of the people’ by the sale of defective 
goods”). 
153. Harriette Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and 
Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 940 (noting that “[t]he goal 
of the [Lanham Act] is not to protect the business enterprise’s trademark from encroach-
ment, but to protect consumers from confusion as to goods and services by maintaining 
the distinctions and identifications of brand names” (internal footnotes omitted)); Klieger, 
supra note 3, at 866 (citing with approval John Wolff, Non-Competing Goods in Trade-
mark Law, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 584 (1937) (“[D]eception of the public is not merely 
a test of trademark infringement but is a ground for trademark protection and a basis 
for . . . relief”)) (emphasis in original). 
154. The fact that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits the confusing use of trade-
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If the main function of trademarks were to prevent the decep-
tion of consumers by manufacturers, the law would have to prevent 
third parties from using trademarks in ways that would create a 
likelihood of confusion (since conduct that causes confusion is de-
ceptive).  The dilution doctrine, however, which is not aimed at 
protecting consumers against deceptive conduct, would not be 
supported by this rationale. 
The problem with the consumer protection model is that the as-
sumptions upon which it is based are flawed.  As discussed in 
Part I, the economic functions of trademarks are to reduce con-
sumer search costs and to resolve the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard – not just to deter deceptive conduct.155  Trade-
marks do deter deception (by ensuring that manufacturers cannot 
get away with selling consumers lemons over an extended period), 
but this is only one of several ways in which they mitigate the 
looming issues of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Moreover, several examples in currently applicable law refute 
the proposition that the driving force behind trademark law as it 
stands today is the prevention of deceit.  One such example is the 
rule of absolute protection that the GTA provides for the identity 
case.156  The GTA imposes a flat prohibition on the use of identical 
marks in connection with identical products, regardless of whether 
there exists a likelihood of confusion.  Were the GTA only con-
cerned with the prevention of confusion, there would be no need 
for the identity rule, simply because the likelihood of confusion is 
particularly high in the identity case.  The fact that such a rule ex-
ists means that the GTA is not just concerned with deterring decep-
tive behavior but that it does more. 
Furthermore, if the deterrence of deceptive behavior were a 
chief concern of trademark law, one would expect to find the law 
interlarded with quality control mechanisms.  Currently, however, 
 
marks and the “false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representa-
tion of fact” in one breath may have nourished this understanding.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) 
(1994 & Supp. 1998). 
155. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
156. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
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such mechanisms exist only in the area of licensing and assign-
ment.  When a trademark owner licenses its mark, courts require 
the licensor to ensure that the licensee keep up a uniform level of 
quality.157  The anti-assignment in gross rule, which makes it ille-
gal for trademark owners to assign their marks to a third party 
without also assigning the goodwill of its business, might equally 
be understood as a quality control provision.  In all other cases, 
however, the trademark owner remains free to change its quality 
rules at any time without even notifying its customers in advance.  
In Germany, moreover, and to a certain extent in the EC generally, 
these rules have either been drastically restricted in scope or have 
been completely abandoned.  Similar trends exist domestically.158 
Against this background, then, courts are accurate when they 
say that trademark law “serves to guarantee the quality of the 
trademarked product.”159  Trademark law certainly guarantees uni-
form product quality in the sense that it creates a framework that 
induces manufacturers to make satisfactory products.  But it does 
not impose an affirmative duty upon them to adopt a certain level 
of quality or even to keep that level up over time.160 
 
157. See Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 
1991), cert. granted, in part, 502 U.S. 1071 aff’d, 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (explaining that 
“[t]he purpose of the quality-control requirement is to prevent the public deception that 
would ensue from variant quality standards under the same mark or dress”). 
158. But see Noah D. Genel, Keep It Real: A Call For a Broader Quality Control 
Requirement in Trademark Law, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 269 
(1997) (arguing that trademark law should be used to ensure that manufacturers maintain 
uniform product quality over time, on which consumers can rely). 
159. Original Appalachian Artworks, 816 F.2d at 75 (Cardamone, J., concurring). 
160. Incidentally, it should be noted that if trademark law were chiefly concerned 
with guaranteeing a certain level of quality, it would probably look very different from 
the currently applicable law.  It might, for instance, treat trademarks as certificates.  Un-
der such a system, every manufacturer whose products comply with a predefined stan-
dard would be permitted to use a certain mark that would certify that its products con-
form to the standard.  Consumer search costs would be even lower than they are under 
the current system, since consumers would have absolute certainty that all products of-
fered under a particular mark share certain predefined characteristics.  There would be no 
adverse selection problem since consumers could tell the products that comply with the 
standard from those that do not, and, as a result, there would be no moral hazard problem, 
either.  If it turned out that such a system would be too complex to administer, we would 
at least expect to find manufacturers under a duty to maintain a uniform level of quality 
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A comparison with the law of unfair competition, in which 
trademark law has its roots, suggests that trademark law appears 
never to have been confined to the narrow task of deterring manu-
facturers from deceiving consumers.161  In both areas, it is said, the 
keystone of infringement is the concept of “likelihood of confu-
sion.”  It seems that what characterizes unfair behavior is that it 
usually deceives or confuses consumers.162  But that equation is by 
no means absolute.  In some instances, courts have qualified be-
havior as unfair even though it did not cause the slightest confu-
sion.163  It seems, therefore, that conduct that gives rise to a likeli-
hood of confusion is just one, albeit a prominent, example of unfair 
behavior.  When one applies that insight to trademark law by as-
suming that “unfairness” is the unspoken normative yardstick and 
that confusion and deception are just legal shortcuts,164 the dilution 
doctrine becomes less exotic.  After all, few would deny that the 
exploitation of a famous mark’s ability to arouse attention or the 
 
over time or to notify their customers of changes.  Moreover, we might expect that third 
parties whose products are of exactly the same quality as those made by the trademark 
owner would be allowed to use the same mark.  The fact that none of this is presently the 
case suggests that the rational basis of trademark protection, as it stands today, is not just 
to prevent deception. 
161. See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (not-
ing that “the common law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair compe-
tition”); see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776 (Stevens, J. concurring) (providing an in-
sightful description of how the two parts of the law developed in relation to each other).  
For Germany, see Supreme Court of the German Reich, RGZ 97, 90; RGZ 111, 192; 
RGZ 120, 330. 
162. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 1:10 (listing, non-exhaustively, instances in 
which courts have found unfair competition.  The list includes: trademark infringement, 
use of confusingly similar business names, simulation of trade dress, false representations 
and false advertising, palming off, sending bad faith cease and desist letters to plaintiff’s 
customers.  As these examples suggest, unfair competition often involves deception 
and/or the creation of confusion among the relevant set of consumers.).  See also Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (noting that “[t]he law 
of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is 
with protecting consumers from confusion as to source”) (emphasis in original). 
163. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 1:10. 
164. Cf. S.46 Rep. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 
1275 (stating that “[u]nfair competition is the genus of which trade-mark infringement is 
one of the species; . . . . All trade-mark cases are cases of unfair competition and involve 
the same legal wrong”). 
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appropriation of its intrinsic repute is not in some sense unfair. 
That notions of “fairness” play an important role in trademark 
law is further suggested by the fact that EC trademark law and the 
GTA both define the requisite behavior that leads to “dilution” as 
the use of a mark that “takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental 
to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.”165 
In summary, therefore, it appears that even in the absence of 
the dilution doctrine, trademark law would do more than merely 
deter manufacturers from deceiving consumers.  Trademark law 
protects all the various functions that trademarks fulfill.  As a re-
sult, the fact that the dilution doctrine has nothing to do with the 
prevention of deceit does not as such make it incompatible with the 
rationale upon which trademark law has always been based. 
2. The Source Theory 
Courts often assume, without much discussion, that the primary 
economic function of trademarks is to identify the source of a 
product.166  This view is shared by many commentators,167 and is 
compatible with the statutory language on both sides of the Atlan-
tic.  The Lanham Act, for example, defines a trademark as “any 
word, name, symbol, or device . . . used by a person . . . to identify 
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from 
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of 
the goods, even if that source is unknown.”168  The GTA and rele-
 
165. GTA, § 14(2)(3), supra note 12, at 612 (emphasis added); Trademark Directive 
No. 89/104, art. 5(2), O.J. L 40/1, at 4 (1989); Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, 
art. 9(1)(c), O.J. L 11/1, at 5 (1994). 
166. See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 35 (noting that “[a] primary pur-
pose of trade dress or trademark protection is to protect that which identifies a product’s 
source”). 
167. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §3:9 n.4 (stating that “there is no doubt 
that identification of source remains one of the primary functions of trademarks.”); see 
also Sean K. Murphy, When “March Madness” Came Back to Chicago, 1998 WIS. L. 
REV. 1337, 1340 (1998) (“The primary function of a trademark is to identify goods and 
services with a particular source”). 
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
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vant EC legislation contain similar sounding provisions.169 
If the unambiguous identification of source were an end in it-
self, it would not be necessary, nor even desirable, to protect 
trademarks against dilution.  It is relatively plain to see how an 
overemphasis of the source-identifying function might make one 
skeptical of the dilution doctrine. 
But to dogmatize the source-identifying function would mean 
to do the exact opposite of what Cohen advocated in his article on 
the functional approach.170  The economic functions that trade-
marks perform can only be identified by examining what they do.  
And as we have seen in Part I, trademarks appear to do more than 
just identify the source of the products to which they are affixed. 
They are full-fledged means of communication, and in the same 
sense as they convey information relating to source, they dissemi-
nate other kinds of information. 
B. Trademarks and Intellectual Property Theory 
Trademarks do not neatly fit into the scheme of intellectual 
property theory as it applies to patent and copyright law.  This dif-
ficulty might account for some of the criticism that the dilution 
doctrine has faced. 
Modern economies, such as those of the US and the EC, are of-
ten mixed in the sense that they combine a free market with a cer-
tain amount of state intervention.  The assumption is that while the 
free interplay of supply and demand will by and large lead to an 
efficient, and presumably, desirable allocation of resources, it may 
at times be necessary for the state to step in, either to remedy mar-
ket failures or to promote non-economic values that the market 
mechanism itself neglects.  Intellectual property laws interfere with 
 
169. See GTA, § 3, supra note 12, at 607; Trademark Directive No. 89/104, art. 2, 
O.J. L 40/1, at 2 (1989); Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, art. 4, O.J. L 11/1, at 3 (1994).  
But see the Preamble of the Trademark Directive, which notes that the source-identifying 
function is only one of the functions served by trademarks (noting that trademarks serve 
“in particular” to identify the source of products). 
170. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 821. 
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the idea of a free market by affording their beneficiaries the right 
to prevent (or at least to restrict) third parties from using their re-
spective subject-matter: patented inventions, copyrighted works of 
art, and trademarks.  As such, they are at odds with the ideal of a 
marketplace in which intellectual resources are free and businesses 
compete for their most efficient usage.171  Therefore, intellectual 
property laws are generally thought to require a special justifica-
tion.  Among the many ways in which such laws may be justified, 
two main types of theories may be distinguished.  One is the “just-
desert” theory, which is based on the notion that there exist non-
economic values that demand that intellectual creations be afforded 
protection.  The other type is the “utilitarian theory,” which essen-
tially argues that in the absence of legal protection, the market it-
self would fail to induce the creation of a sufficient amount of in-
tellectual products. 
The just-desert theory comes in a variety of forms.172  Its basic 
idea is that as a matter of fairness, those who create something that 
benefits society should receive a reward for their efforts.173  For 
patent and copyright law, it thus offers an intriguing justification.  
The notion of “just desert” is so deeply rooted in the values of our 
society that, regardless of whatever utilitarian reasons there may be 
to afford creators exclusive rights in what they devise –- reasons 
that are completely independent of any moral considerations –- it is 
 
171. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he general rule of law is, that the noblest of hu-
man productions – knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas – become, after 
voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use”); see also American 
Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959) (observing that “imita-
tion is the life blood of competition”). 
172. See Wendy Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of In-
tellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).  The “just-desert” theory is often based on 
the Locke’s theory of property.  See John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter 
Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1960). 
173. See Port, supra note 3, at 473 (providing a concise summary of Locke’s just-
desert theory, and noting that “the normative aspect of Locke’s theory is that property 
should be granted to the one who exerted labor upon the thing and to reward that person, 
thereby encouraging work and disclosure so that all can put the idea to use”). 
STRASSERFMT4.DOC 9/29/2006  3:23 PM 
2000] DILUTION REVISITED 423 
 
hard to deny that it acts at least as a catalyst to how we think about 
patent and copyright law.174  Trademarks are much harder to ex-
plain on just-desert notions since anyone can come up with a 
trademark and use it in commerce (provided that he or she is able 
to run a business).175  As a result, trademarks do not benefit from 
our goodwill, at least not to the same extent as patents and copy-
rights.  Nevertheless, there have been attempts to fit them into the 
tight corset of “just-desert.”176  Not surprisingly, these attempts 
yield artificial results.  This might explain why some courts and 
commentators are intuitively more skeptical of the dilution doc-
trine than of comparable extensions of patent or copyright law 
(such as the fourteen year-term for design patents).177 
The other main branch of intellectual property theory is the 
utilitarian theory.  This theory is less moralistic, and presumably, 
 
174. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (inter-
mingling just-desert considerations with other theories: “First, patent law seeks to foster 
and reward invention . . . “ (emphasis added)). 
175. See Port, supra note 3, at 487 (noting that the just-desert theory is particularly 
unsuitable to justify the dilution doctrine since the trademark owner “has not exerted any 
work upon the mark as used on non-competing and non-confusing goods or services”). 
176. See, e.g., Case C-10/89, HAG II 1990 E.C.R. at I-3732, para. 18 (observing 
that, in Europe, “[w]hereas patents reward the creativity of the inventor . . ., trade marks 
reward the manufacturer who consistently produces high-quality goods and they thus 
stimulate economic progress”).  Yet, the kind of “reward” that a trademark provides is 
very different from the reward that a patent or a copyright confers.  The former is a re-
ward for making products of satisfactory quality whereas the latter rewards time, effort 
and ingenuity spent by an individual for the benefit of the public at large.  See also Mo-
skin, supra note 3, at 130 (noting that there is “something fundamentally unfair about the 
defendant’s unauthorized use of plaintiff’s famous brand name” without, however, being 
able to express the unfair quality of the evil behavior in words). 
177. See, e.g., Case 40/70, Sirena v. EDA 1971 E.C.R. 69, 87 (noting that “[b]oth 
from the economic and from the human point of view the interests protected by patent 
legislation merit greater respect than those protected by trade-marks . . . . From the hu-
man point of view, the debt which society owes to the ‘inventor’ of the name ‘Prep Good 
Morning,’ [a brand of shaving cream,] is certainly not of the same nature, to say the least, 
as that which humanity owes to the discoverer of penicillin.”) (Opinion of Advocate 
General Dutheillet de Lamothe).  The European Court echoed the Advocate General’s 
argument in its decision: “[A] trade-mark right is distinguishable . . . from other rights of 
industrial and commercial property, inasmuch as the interests protected by the latter are 
usually more important, and merit a higher degree of protection, than the interests pro-
tected by an ordinary trademark.”  Id. at 82. 
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therefore, less subjective.  Phrased in utilitarian language, the prob-
lem that patent and copyright law seek to address is the following: 
in the absence of legal protection, nobody (except maybe for a 
handful of humble idealists) would find it viable to search for in-
ventions or to create works of art.  Third parties could easily re-
produce intellectual property creations at a fraction of the cost that 
it would take to devise the product.  The result would be an under-
supply both of inventions and of works of art.  Patent law and 
copyright law resolve this problem by protecting creators against 
potential free-riders.  In giving them the carrot of monopoly prof-
its, the law induces them to engage in creative activity.  The down-
side is that in doing so the law prevents competition in the exploi-
tation of intellectual products, once they have been conceived.  
Patents and copyrights are hence similar to alcohol: while they can 
do wonders when applied in small quantities, large dosages may 
have the opposite effect.  Many provisions of the Patent Act178 and 
the Copyright Act179 may be understood as an attempt to adjust 
these inherently conflicting goals.180 
Patent, copyright and trademark law all may be explained on a 
utilitarian basis.  While the quid pro quo that characterizes the 
former is obvious (if you are sufficiently creative, then we will 
give you exclusive rights, so you can earn money), it does not eas-
ily translate into trademark law.181  The functional approach, as we 
have seen, is far more complex.  Courts sometimes neglect these 
 
178. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1994 & Supp. 1998)). 
179. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1994 & Supp. 1998)). 
180. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51 (noting that “[t]he federal patent sys-
tem . . . embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure 
of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the ex-
clusive right to practice the invention for a period of years”).  Examples of this balancing 
act are the various threshold requirements (such as novelty and nonobviousness in patent 
law and originality in copyright law) and the fact that the term of protection is limited in 
time. 
181. The creation of trademarks does not suffer from the same discrepancy between 
the cost of creation and the cost of reproduction that characterizes inventions and works 
of art and that creates the undersupply in these two areas. 
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differences and try to apply the same utilitarian principles to 
trademark law as they apply to patent and copyright law.  The fu-
tility of these attempts may have reinforced their skepticism to-
wards the dilution doctrine. 
C. Competition Concerns 
An important set of concerns that has been raised against the 
dilution doctrine is that trademarks restrain competition and that 
the dilution doctrine, as it affords trademark owners far-reaching 
entitlements, is particularly anti-competitive.182  While, these con-
cerns provide enough material for an independent paper, I will 
briefly address them here. 
Even though the dilution doctrine may have certain anti-
competitive effects, it remains a worthwhile doctrine.  The dilution 
doctrine,183 like trademark law in general,184 increases the amount 
of information available to consumers and thereby enhances com-
petition.  These pro-competitive effects outweigh the anti-
competitive effects mentioned above. 
One often-expressed concern is that trademark protection 
might potentially lead to a situation of scarcity in which the num-
ber of signs that are suitable as trademarks might become so lim-
ited that it would be difficult for new market entrants to find 
enough suitable signs.  This would suggest that we should prefer 
narrow entitlements to broad ones.  The scarcity concern, however, 
while legitimate, does not refute the dilution doctrine.  Indeed, the 
dilution doctrine appears to pose less of a threat to the availability 
of trademarks than one might initially think.  The pool of potential 
trademarks is virtually unlimited, especially in the realm of arbi-
trary and fanciful words and symbols.  Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that fanciful marks might be less suitable for the purpose 
 
182. Given the restricted scope of trademark entitlements, the issue was merely of 
academic interest for a long period of time.  The dilution doctrine, however, with its far 
broader protection, gave a new impetus to the discussion. 
183. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
184. See discussion infra Part I. 
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of identifying products and communicating with consumers than 
suggestive marks or descriptive marks that have acquired secon-
dary meaning.185  As regards those trademarks for which the scar-
city argument has some force (such as  suggestive marks), there are 
a number of doctrines that make it unlikely that a situation of scar-
city might arise in practice.  Examples of such doctrines include 
“distinctiveness,” “functionality,” “fair use” and “genericity.”  Fi-
nally, even if we thought that trademark law did not go far enough 
to dispel the scarcity concern, this should not change our attitude 
towards the dilution doctrine.  The scope of the aforesaid safe-
guards is independent of whether the law affords trademark owners 
narrow entitlements, such as it did in the past, or broad ones, such 
as those introduced by the FTDA.  Although one may have to rede-
fine the scope of these safeguards, the dilution doctrine should not 
be abandoned. 
A related concern has been raised in the area of trade dress 
law.186  Over the years, courts have included product configura-
tions in their definition of the concept of “trade dress.”187  Only 
 
185. Suffice it to point out that multinational enterprises often use one single trade-
mark all over the world even when that mark has a concrete meaning in some countries 
but not in others (for example, the word, and thus the mark “Mitsubishi” means “three 
diamonds” in Japanese, whereas in English or German, it has no particular meaning).  If 
the mark’s meaning, its appearance or its sound had any measurable effect on the popu-
larity of the products that carry it, clearly, we would expect the success of these enter-
prises to vary between different countries and cultures.  In practice, this is not the case.  
The fact that many trademarks (including “Mitsubishi”) are used on a worldwide basis 
suggests that the aesthetic value and its concrete meaning do not have a significant im-
pact on its competitive value. 
186. See, e.g., Fun-Damental Too, Ltd., v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 999 
(2d Cir. 1997) (defining trade dress as “the design and appearance of the product together 
with all the elements making up the overall image that serves to identify the product pre-
sented to the consumer”). 
187. For a brief history of how trademark law developed over time to encompass 
trade dress and to extend to product configurations, see Two Pesos, 505 U.S. 763 (1992) 
(applying the Lanham Act to trade dress); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 
787 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the trade dress that was at issue in Two Pesos – the 
décor of a Mexican restaurant – was “as akin to product configuration as to packaging” 
and that, as a result, “Two Pesos [rested] on a presumption that ‘trade dress’ is a single 
concept that encompasses both product configuration and packaging”); Duraco Prod. v. 
Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1724 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing how the traditional 
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three months after the FTDA had been signed into law, a court in-
dicated that as a result, the FTDA, too, would apply to product 
configurations.188  Shortly thereafter, however, the question be-
came controversial.189  The core issue is whether the dilution doc-
trine, when applied to product configurations, would give rise to 
conflicts with the patent system.190  If manufacturers could obtain 
quasi-patents on the basis of the Lanham Act, they could bypass 
the stringent threshold requirements of the Patent Act.191  More-
over, not only would it be easier for them to obtain protection, such 
protection would also last longer; while patents are limited in time, 
trademark protection lasts forever. 
Another related problem is that the Lanham Act is based on the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution,192  whereas other intellec-
tual property statutes, such as the Patent Act193 and the Copyright 
Act,194 are based on the Patent and Copyright clause of the Consti-
tution.195  Unlike the former, the latter demands that the entitle-
 
threshold criteria should apply to product configurations); see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. 
at 776 (Stevens, J. concurring) (discussing how trade dress law has developed over time). 
188. See Sunbeam Prods. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (S.D. 
Miss. 1996), aff’d, 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997); cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1118 (1998). 
189. Compare, Clinique Lab. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. at 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(noting that nothing in the language of Section 43(c) bars its application to trade dress, 
and such application is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Two 
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773), with I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 27 (observing that “it is 
possible that Congress did not really envision protection for product design from dilution 
by a competing product under the FTDA, but the language it used does not permit us to 
exclude such protection categorically and rare cases can be imagined”). 
190. See generally Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Management and Protection of Brand 
Equity in Product Configurations, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 59; see also Heald, supra note 3, 
at 424.  It should be noted that overlaps between trademark and patent law would not as 
such be a problem.  See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993). 
Problems would arise only if it turned out that, as a result of these overlaps, the balance 
between exclusive rights and competition that patent law seeks to achieve would be jeop-
ardized. 
191. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (these include, in particular, 
novelty and nonobviousness). 
192. See U.S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. 
193. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
194. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
195. See U.S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8; David Lange, The Intellectual Property 
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ments that the law affords beneficiaries be limited in time.  Hence, 
if companies could use trademarks as “back-door patents,” this 
would create a number of intriguing constitutional issues.196 
A detailed discussion of these issues would, unfortunately, go 
beyond the scope of this Article.  However, it should be noted that 
the courts’ practice of treating product configurations as trade 
dress, subject to certain conditions, is relatively uncontested.197  If 
product configurations fall within the scope of the Lanham Act, it 
is unclear why the FTDA, which forms an integral part of the 
Lanham Act, should not apply equally.198  The opposite view ar-
gues that Congress merely intended to “federalize” the anti-
dilution laws that existed at the state level and that these state laws 
generally do not apply to product configurations.199  It turns out, 
however, that the various state laws are anything but uniform.200  
 
Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and 
Some Thoughts About Why We Ought To Care, 59 SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213 
(1996). 
196. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d 27.  But see San Francisco Arts & Athlet-
ics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987) (indicating, prior to 
the enactment of the FTDA, that Congress could adopt an anti-dilution statute without 
getting into constitutional troubles).  Incidentally, it should be noted that courts have held 
comparable state statutes preempted by the Intellectual Property Clause.  See also In Es-
cada AG v. Limited, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding a New York anti-
dilution statute preempted because it did not require the plaintiff to establish a likelihood 
of confusion); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (holding a Florida statute that prohibited the 
molding and copying of boat hulls preempted for similar reasons). 
197. It is also consistent with the functional approach and the open-ended language 
in which the Lanham Act defines the concept of “trademark”.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (de-
fining “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof”); see also Two 
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773 (noting that “§ 43(a) provides no basis for distinguishing between 
trademark and trade dress”). 
198. Cf. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770, in which the court reasons similarly: “There is 
no persuasive reason to apply to trade dress a general requirement of secondary meaning 
which is at odds with the principles generally applicable to infringement suits under § 
43(a).” 
199. See Heald, supra note 3, at 419.  But see Eric Prager, The Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial likelihood of confusion, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 121, 127 (1996). 
200. See Kimbley Muller, Dilution Law: At A Crossroads? A Position Of Advocacy 
In Support Of Adoption Of A Preemptive Federal Antidilution Statute, 83 TRADEMARK 
REP. 175, 187 (1993) (lamenting “the development of twenty-five individual different 
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In certain respects, the Lanham Act takes a decidedly different ap-
proach from the way these laws have been drafted and are ap-
plied.201  These factors erode the aforesaid argument.  Finally, the 
Trademark Regulation, the Trademark Directive and the GTA 
clearly give the concept of “trademark” an extensive interpretation, 
affording words, symbols and other types of trademarks equal pro-
tection.  In particular, each of them provides, without qualification, 
that their substantive provisions shall apply to “the shape of goods 
or of their packaging.”202 
While the courts’ practice is consistent with trademark law, it 
appears to be compatible with patent law as well.  The reason it 
seems unlikely that trademark law in general, and the dilution doc-
trine in particular, could ever transgress into the realm of patent 
law is because of the “functionality” doctrine.203  Under that doc-
trine, courts deny trademark protection to trade dress (and thus also 
to product configurations) when the aspect for which protection is 
sought concerns a functional aspect of a product.  The scope of the 
doctrine varies by circuit, but the basic idea remains the same.  In 
one case in which a court denied trade dress protection to a product 
configuration on functionality grounds, it did so expressly in view 
of the fact that the product configuration was a significant part of 
an invention protected by a patent.204  EC and German trademark 
law arrive at similar results by denying protection to devices that 
“consist exclusively of . . . the shape which results from the nature 
of the goods themselves, or the shape of goods which is necessary 
to obtain a technical result, or the shape which gives substantial 
 
antidilution laws”). 
201. See Moskin, supra note 3, at 128 (quoting a number of decisions that show that 
state courts granting anti-dilution protection often require a showing of likelihood of con-
fusion, which is no requirement under the provisions of the Lanham Act). 
202. See Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, art. 4, O.J. L 11/1, at 3 (1994); Trade-
mark Directive No. 89/104, art. 2, O.J. L 40/1, at 2 (1989); GTA, § 3(1), supra note 12, at 
607. 
203. Some courts apply an “aesthetic functionality” doctrine as well in order to 
avoid conflicts with design patents. 
204. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1510 (10th 
Cir. 1995). 
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value to the goods.”205  The functionality doctrine, when properly 
applied, avoids conflicts between the Lanham Act and the patent 
system.206  In Judge Posner’s words: “provided that a defense of 
functionality is recognized, there is no conflict [between trademark 
law and] federal patent law.”207  Although Posner made this state-
ment before the FTDA was signed into law, the subsequent enact-
ment of the statute ought to have no impact on the continued valid-
ity of his argument.  The way in which the functionality doctrine 
avoids conflicts with the patent system is not by restricting trade-
mark entitlements but by restricting the scope of trademark law (by 
excluding the functional features of a product from the realm of 
trademark protection).  The FTDA merely introduced a new set of 
entitlements but it did not alter the scope of the Lanham Act or af-
fect the way the functionality doctrine works.  Therefore, it does 
not disturb the balance between trademark law and patent law.  In-
terestingly, the Supreme Court once recognized, albeit under a dif-
ferent set of laws, that Congress has discretion as to whether it 
wants to afford signs—in this case the “Olympic” symbols—
protection only against confusion or also against a dilution of their 
distinctiveness.208 
A final reason why one might worry about the dilution doctrine 
is the fact that trademark protection creates artificial barriers to 
 
205. See Trademark Regulation No. 40/94, art. 7(1)(e), O.J. L 11/1, at 4 (1994); 
Trademark Directive No. 89/104, art. 3(1)(3), O.J. L 40/1, at 3 (1989); GTA, § 3(2), su-
pra note 12, at 607. 
206. Cf. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (noting that 
“[t]he functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition 
by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allow-
ing a producer to control a useful product feature”). 
207. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985).  See also 
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775 (dismissing similar concerns for competition as “not persua-
sive . . . [since o]nly nonfunctional, distinctive trade dress is protected under § 43(a)”). 
208. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 539 (“[a]lthough the Lanham 
Act protects only against confusing uses, Congress’ judgment respecting a certain word is 
not so limited.  Congress reasonably could conclude that most commercial uses of the 
Olympic words and symbols are likely to be confusing.  It also could determine that un-
authorized uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the [United States Olym-
pic Committee] by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commercial value of the 
marks”). 
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market entry.  The dilution doctrine, as a particularly broad set of 
entitlements, might be seen as unduly reinforcing these barriers.209  
The principal impediment that trademark protection creates is that 
in order to enter a new market, a company first has to overcome 
consumers’ loyalty to the existing brands.  As the FTC noted in its 
Craswell Report, however, this loyalty merely reflects consumer 
satisfaction and as such is not worrisome.210  Whatever the merits 
of the barrier of entry argument, it is inapt to criticize the dilution 
doctrine.  Those brands that make it hard for new companies to en-
ter the market are those that would be in direct competition with 
the new products.  Hence, the only way to remove this barrier 
would be to allow the new entrant to capitalize on the goodwill of 
the established brand.  Such behavior, while it would clearly in-
fringe the identity rule and the likelihood of confusion test, would 
leave the dilution doctrine unaffected.211  In summary, therefore, to 
abolish the entry barriers created by trademarks, one would have to 
get rid of the traditional tests for trademark infringement, but not 
the dilution doctrine. 
The discussion in the preceding sections suggests that there 
may be several reasons why the dilution doctrine has had such a 
hard stand in the United States.  First, one’s attitude towards the 
doctrine depends on one’s understanding of the functional ap-
proach.  My own understanding is that the main economic func-
tions performed by trademarks are to identify products and to 
communicate with consumers.  On the basis of this understanding, 
I have offered a utilitarian explanation of the dilution doctrine and 
 
209. See Klieger, supra note 3, at 856.  It should be noted, however, that the ques-
tion is contested – even among economists.  See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, Compul-
sory Licensing Of A Trademark: Remedy Or Penalty, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 197, 244 
(1977); see also 1 MCCARTHY, § 2:12, (providing a comprehensive list of resources). 
210. “If consumers prefer not to purchase [the brands of new entrants], it can be ar-
gued that nothing would be gained by their entry.” 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2:4 (cit-
ing to the Craswell Report 7 (1979)). 
211. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(noting that “[t]he overriding purpose of anti-dilution statutes is to prohibit a merchant of 
noncompetitive goods from selling its products by trading on the goodwill and reputation 
of another’s mark”). 
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of how it fits in with the traditional concepts of infringement.  Of-
ten, however, trademarks are understood as devices whose primary 
purpose is to ensure that manufacturers do not confuse consumers 
or who identify the source of the products in connection with 
which they are used.  The fact that either of these goals could be 
achieved without protecting famous marks against dilution may 
account for some of the skepticism towards the dilution doctrine.  
Moreover, as we have seen, the dilution doctrine does not easily 
square with the traditional theories used to explain the need for 
patent and copyright law. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears that the FTDA has altered the landscape of trade-
mark law by introducing new sets of trademark entitlements for 
famous marks, but it has not fundamentally changed the rational 
basis of trademark protection.  In Part I, I developed a functional 
approach to the dilution doctrine and concluded that that doctrine 
rests on the same premises as the likelihood of confusion test and 
the identity rule as found in Europe.  In Part II, I analyzed several 
reasons why some commentators have nevertheless been skeptical 
of the FTDA. 
Given the global trend to adopt anti-dilution statutes, it is likely 
that the FTDA is here to stay.  Therefore, it will be necessary to 
come to terms with it, and rather than argue that there should not 
be a dilution doctrine,212 one should examine it dogmatically and 
try to fit it in with existing trademark doctrines. 
 
 
212. See Moskin, supra note 3, at 122 (calling the dilution doctrine a phenomenon 
that “has proven wholly resistant [sic!] to analysis”) (emphasis added)). 
